On Thu, May 26, 2016 at 7:40 AM, Peter Kurrasch <[email protected]> wrote:
> My suggestion is to frame the issue‎ as: What is reasonable to expect of a
> CA if somebody sees bad stuff going on? How should CA's be notified? What
> sort of a response is warranted and in what timeframe? What guidelines
> should CA's use when determining what their response should be?
>
> All of this is worthy of discussion, but it's gonna get complicated.

With all due respect, a number of the items on your list are
orthogonal to certificates - they're a discussion about "bad" things
you can do if "encryption" is possible / if "privacy" is possible. I
don't think it's ignorance about how encryption can be used to do bad
things, it's a valuation that the *good* things
encryption/confidentiality/integrity enable far outweigh the bad. We
saw this in the First Crypto Wars, and we're seeing this now, arguably
the Second Crypto Wars.

You haven't actually addressed how or why CAs have a role to play here
- it's presented as a given. You recognize there's nuance about
expectations, which is an open question, but you're ignoring the more
fundamental question - do CAs have a role to play in *preventing*
encryption, or is the only role they have to *enable* encryption.

While not speaking for Mozilla, I think the unquestionable desire from
some here is to find ways to increase encryption, but not to introduce
ways to prevent encryption - whether through means of policy or
technology.
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