On Thu, May 26, 2016 at 1:58 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> wrote: > What has encryption got to do with it?
The "bad" raised was unrelated to certificates, publicly trusted or otherwise. As Nick also pointed out, a number of the "bad" is just as accomplish through other means independent of certificates - whether using raw public keys, DANE, etc. That is, the concerns raised were about TLS, not about certificates. > The WebPKI model was two stage. First we make it difficult for people to > gain unlimited numbers of credentials. There is a cost to acquire a > certificate that is (hopefully) low for a legitimate user but makes it > uneconomic for a criminal to treat them as disposable. That's not true, present or historically, but I don't believe it's germane to the discussion to get into the nuance here, as it doesn't really fit Peter (K's) discussion of bad. > Now the problem here is that there are also folk who just want to turn on > encryption and that is all and they don't care about doing online commerce > or banking. They just want to keep their email secret. And that is fine. But > that does not mean that people who only want to do confidentiality should > rip up the infrastructure that is designed to serve a different purpose. It would seem you're suggesting that CAs aren't the right infrastructure to enable the Internet's growth and user's security, which may be true, but would be a surprising statement to make. Otherwise, the choice of the term "rip up" to suggest that, regardless of original intent, the infrastructure may better serve users' and security more by doing something more broadly scoped seems... unnecessary simplistic. Put differently, even if it were true that the goal of the Web PKI was to "prevent bad," it still suffers from the same problem - first, the definition of "bad" posited on this thread is largely related to encryption (first and foremost), and thus orthogonal to certificates, but in several of the remaining cases, the definition of bad is a statement that users have unrealistic expectations about what certificates can/do provide. Ironically, those unrealistic expectations may have been caused by CAs themselves and by their marketing teams. So to address these "bad" uses of certificates, it's necessary as the community to decide whether encryption is bad, whether the 'undesirable' uses of encryption and the desire to prevent such uses is worth the risk to the 'good' uses of encryption and the desire to promote them, and to decide on what the reasonable and realistic expectations of certificates should be. But I think it's uncharitable to suggest the infrastructure is being ripped up - it's being questioned as to whether the original goals, whatever they may be, were realistic, and whether the promises made, especially by CAs, are ones we can or should keep. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

