On Thursday, 14 July 2016 05:18:20 UTC+1, Andrew Ayer  wrote:
> Revocation does not address the risk that this mis-issuance has caused
> to the ecosystem, since collided certificates (the ones we cannot see,
> and need to be worried about) have different serial numbers and
> therefore do not appear revoked.

Unless I'm missing something if Symantec produced these certificates in a 
sensible way, any potential attacker outside Symantec (including TSYS) will not 
have known the serial numbers of the certificates in advance of their being 
produced, let alone been able to choose them. Without knowing the serial 
numbers in advance there is no way to perform the MD-style chosen prefix 
collision attack on SHA-1 that I can see. Do you suppose that attackers might 
have a pre-image attack instead?
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