On 14/07/16 04:02, [email protected] wrote:
On Tuesday, July 12, Symantec erroneously produced and issued 8 SHA-1 
certificates in support of one customer’s application to submit SHA-1 TBS 
Certificates to the CA/B Forum for a SHA-1 exception. Symantec has revoked the 
certificates.

Sanjay,

The final report [1] on Symantec's September 2015 "Test Certificates Incident" noted that:
   "One of these test certificates with a CN=www.google.com was an
    Extended Validation (EV) test certificate and was logged to public
    Certificate Transparency (CT) log servers which is standard practice
    by default for EV certificates issued by CAs."

That sentence must be referring to this precertificate:
https://crt.sh/?id=9314698

So, would it be fair to also classify these 8 SHA-1 precertificates as "test certificates" ?

The final report [1] also noted (emphasis mine) that:
   "3. *We thoroughly analyzed the nature of the test certificates, and
    more importantly, the nature of how/why they were issued* – that
    informed us of the true risks (e.g. whether the private keys and
    certificates were exposed – which they were not). This root cause
    analysis crystalized our remediation steps, and guided us on what
    actions were necessary to prevent this from occurring again in the
    future, augmenting the extensive technical controls and procedures
    already in place.
    4. *We identified and implemented changes to tools, processes, and
    personnel to prevent this in the future*."

Why were the changes resulting from that internal process review insufficient to prevent these 8 SHA-1 precertificates from being issued?

An internal process review is underway.
<snip>

How many internal process reviews will it take to *actually* "prevent this in the future" ?


[1] http://www.symantec.com/connect/sites/default/files/Test_Certificates_Incident_Update.pdf

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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