The GoDaddy situation raises an additional issue. Mozilla is neither adding any of the 8951 revoked certificates to OneCRL, nor untrusting any GoDaddy intermediates. However, a more serious incident might have led us to consider that course of action. In that regard, the following information is worth considering.
The certificates in the GoDaddy case chain up to two different intermediates: GoDaddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2 : 6563 Starfield Secure Certificate Authority - G2 : 2388 Those two intermediates together support over a million certificates, with a roughly 90/10 split between GoDaddy and Starfield. GoDaddy does not have a rotation policy for intermediates. Un-trusting such intermediates from the current date onwards is possible; un-trusting them from a date in the past would be extremely impactful to sites. Using this particular problem as an example, it occurred between July 2016 and January 2017. If we wanted to untrust these intermediates from July 2016 onwards, that would affect (by my rough guess) around 300,000 certificates. (The actual figure will depend upon the lifetime distribution histogram.) Contacting that many customers and getting them to rotate their certs would be a gargantuan effort. What can be done about the potential future issue (which might happen with any large CA) of the need to untrust a popular intermediate? Suggestions welcome. Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

