On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 11:56 AM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> Patrick, thanks, it appears my attempt at brevity produced density.
>
> - No amount of mantra, training, email notification, blinking text and
> certificate installation checkers make 100% of IT staff who install
> certificates on servers aware that issuing CAs change and need to be
> installed with the server certificate when they do.
> - Many servers do not support PKCS#7 installation.
> - When you roll an intermediate issuer and you modify the end entity
> certificate's AIA CA Issuers URI at the same time, the server presents an
> EE
> to the browser that provides a remedy to path validation failure.
> - The browser does its normal path discovery using cached discovered
> intermediates.
> - At rollover, the browser doesn't find the EE's issuer cached locally.
> - The browser chases AIA to the issuer that the EE asserts is its issuer,
> validates that, and caches the issuer for another <lifespan limit> years.
> It's a one-validation latency cost per end user given cached path
> discovery.
>

In the absence of AIA, this quickly becomes discoverable for servers. The
only reason it represents a burden on CAs today is precisely because of
customers' (inadvertant) reliance on AIA to correct for server
misconfiguration.

As mentioned, I'm a strong proponent of AIA - I think it serves a valuable
role in ecosystem agility for root migrations - but I don't think it's
necessarily good for users when it's used to paper over (clear) server
misconfigurations, which is the situation you describe - where the path
from the EE to the Intermediate is improper. I'm more thinking about
situations for where the Intermediate to Root path may change, in order to
accommodate changes in the Root (from Root 1 to Root 2).

Ultimately, it seems like it's a question of whether it's "too burdensome"
to expect servers properly configure their TLS certificate, therefore, the
argument is browser should employ logic to obviate that need. However,
given tools like CFSSL, is that really a good or compelling argument -
particularly one to suggest it's a gating factor for improvement? Isn't it
largely a question of how CAs engage with their customers for the
provisioning and deployment of certificates, rather than a holistic
ecosystem issue (of which I consider root migration to be part of the
latter)
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