On Monday, February 20, 2017 at 11:50:59 AM UTC, Gervase Markham wrote: > On 16/02/17 18:26, [email protected] wrote: > > Trustis has now revoked the SHA-1 Certificate for hmrcset.trustis.com > > and replaced it with a SHA-256 Certificate. This status is reflected > > in the latest CRL. > > Hi Blake, > > We are pleased to hear that, but the detail of your report compares > somewhat unfavourably with that of QuoVadis, about whom a similar > problem was raised in the same timeframe. You can find their report here: > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/xxtUlTOo6ak/XX6WqlEmEQAJ > > We would appreciate it if Trustis could produce a similar document > within the week. > > Many thanks, > > Gerv
Hi Gerv, Please see Trustis' formal report into the incident posted below: Trustis Incident Report Background Trustis provides specific services for a UK government department, HMRC. This organisation acts as the only relying party and also has considerable control and influence over the nature of the service. The hmrcset.trustis.com certificate provides TLS protection for an enrolment portal which forms part of this service. It is used by a small number of applicants that have a pre-defined and established relationship with HMRC. The private keys for this certificate are managed and controlled by Trustis. This particular certificate was approaching expiry and a replacement was issued as part of a routine renewal process. Certificates for the HMRC SET Service are issued from the SHA-1 “FPS TT Issuing Authority”, which is now only used for this service. The replacement server certificate for hmrcset.trustis.com was issued from the FPS TT IA, via a manual process under the mistaken belief that this was necessary for this particular service to operate correctly. Trustis has some time ago, migrated all TLS certificate production to SHA-256 Issuing Authorities. The small number of previously issued SHA-1 TLS certificates issued from “FPS TT”, that had lifetimes extending beyond 1 Jan 2017, were revoked towards the end of 2016. Actions Upon receiving notification of the mis-issuance, an assessment was conducted. As a result Trustis issued a replacement SHA-2 certificate and revoked the non-compliant certificate. .This was included in the CRL issued at 1806 hrs (UTC) on the 16th February 2017. As part of the incident handling procedure, Trustis’ security management committee, commissioned a full investigation into the circumstances surrounding this incident and the details are provided below. Investigation The generation of the private keys and the production of the certificate in question are managed via Trustis internal procedures. These are separate to those for external Subscribers. In this case the operation was made somewhat more complex due to the transition from SHA-1 to SHA-2 and the difficulty our customer had endured as a result. As a result of this, the operator mistakenly issued the certificate based on the customer’s SHA-1 requirements and it was subsequently issued from “FPS-TT”, under the belief that this was necessary for this particular service to operate. The operator had failed to recognise that, despite the transition difficulties for our customer, a new SHA-2 profile specification should have been used. As a result of the investigation the security management committee has made a number of recommendations. Principal amongst these is enhanced training and oversight for technical staff that deal with unique certificates or certificate management in complex circumstances that are not part of standard operations. Regards, Blake Morgan Trustis Ltd _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

