On Thursday, March 16, 2017 at 11:00:51 AM UTC, Gervase Markham wrote: > Hi Blake, > > On 02/03/17 16:26, blake morgan wrote: > > We have engaged with our external auditors in relation to this and the > > previous certificate that was reported. Once that activity has concluded we > > will be providing further information. > > Do you have an ETA for this incident report? It's been quite some time > now. I am still interested to understand how a "full investigation" of > the first certificate failed to turn up the second. > > Gerv
Hi Gerv, Following further discussion with, and guidance from Mozilla, it has been determined that the getset.trustis.com certificate issued in November 2016 was a mis-issuance. This incident has highlighted an ambiguity arising from the mismatch of scope between CAB Forum BRs v1.3 and Mozilla CP v2.3. It is useful to note that the Mozilla CP v2.4 provides revised wording which represents an improvement in this regard. However, it is suggested that careful attention is given when issuing certificates which fall outside the scope of CAB Forum BRs, but may nevertheless be subject to provisions of the CAB Forum BRs under the Mozilla CP. In support of improving clarity Mozilla has posted an issue here https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/72. Regards, Blake _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

