On Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 1:41 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> The EV Guidelines require certificates issued for .onion include the 
> cabf-TorServiceDescriptor extension, defined in the EV Guidelines, as part of 
> these certificates. This is required by Section 11.7.1 (1) of the EV 
> Guidelines, reading: "For a Certificate issued to a Domain Name with .onion 
> in the right-most label of the Domain Name, the CA SHALL confirm that, as of 
> the date the Certificate was issued, the Applicant’s control over the .onion 
> Domain Name in accordance with Appendix F. "

I don't see anything requiring this extension to be included in
certificates. (hat tip to Andrew Ayer for noticing the lack of
requirement)

> The intent was to prevent collisions in .onion names due to the use of a 
> truncated SHA-1 hash collision with distinct keys, as that would allow two 
> parties to respond on the hidden service address using the same key.
>
> Last week, a SHA-1 collision was announced.
>
> In examining the .onion precertificates DigiCert has logged, available at 
> https://crt.sh/?q=facebookcorewwwi.onion , I could not find a single one 
> bearing this extension, which suggests these are all misissued certificates 
> and violations of the EV Guidelines.
>
> During a past discussion of precertificates, at 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/siHOXppxE9k/0PLPVcktBAAJ
>  ,  Mozilla did not discuss whether or not it considered precertificates 
> misissuance, although one module peer (hi! it's me!) suggested they were.
>
> This interpretation seems consistent with the discussions during the WoSign 
> issues, as some of those certificates examined were logged precertificates.
>
> Have I missed something in examining these certificates? Am I correct that 
> they appear to be violations?
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