On Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 2:19 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> The requirements don't specify what to do with this information. I know > our product team interpreted this as part of the validation methods and > exchange of key information, not something that was included in a > certificate. We can include this information, but the guidelines are > unclear what we do with this. Yeah, let's fix this in the EVGs over in the CA/Browser Forum. As you know from our private and public conversations, Jeremy, Google's support for allowing this issuance was contingent upon that extension appearing within the certificate, as that was the only mitigation .onion owners had to detect different-key, same-name collisions. It was this property - the combined implicit logging (due to Chrome's CT policy, although not explicitly required of CAs) and explicit extension that provided the safety bar for sites. This is also why we pushed for the revocation of the existing certs. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

