Hi Gerv,

I'm assuming as with previous discussions, you'd like to keep the
discussion on the list.

Overall: I would suggest every "should" be replaced with either a "must" or
a "shall" RFC2119 style, to avoid any "best practice" vs "required mandate"
confusion.

1.1 Scope
  Item 2:
    Bullet 1: This would allow the anyEKU to be considered 'out of scope'.
Is that intentional? (notwithstanding Section 5.3.1)
    Bullet 2: This potentially leads to confusion as to what it means to
'not allow' such types, given that nameConstraints only apply to the type
for which they're present. That is, the absence of an iPAddress
nameConstraint means there's no restriction, while the presence has to be
constructed in a way to exclude all IP addresses in the excludedSubtrees.
Similarly, as captured during the SRVName discussions in the CA/Browser
Forum, there's uncertainty as to how to capture such an exclusion with an
SRVName nameConstraint.

  I don't know how best to suggest rephrasing this, other than I think the
scope may need to forward-reference a subsequent section that defines the
technical means for that scope. I suspect you were trying to avoid this,
but I think that to avoid ambiguity as to what the scope is, you'll want to
ensure a precise technical definition is linked to the prosaic goal.

  Item 3: Similar to above, this allows excluding the anyEKU from scope
(notwithstanding Section 5.3.1)

3
  Item 2: I realize the intent is to match the current wording, but it may
be worth considering clarifying here, in the event of an RA who performs
validation/verification functions, but does not press the so-called "Big
Red Button" to issue the cert. Imagine a process where CA receives a
request, RA does domain validation (... incorrectly), RA tells Subscriber,
Subscriber then asks CA to issue, CA issues now that RA has fulfilled the
DCV - this is absolutely something for which multi-factor authentication is
intended, in the current Mozilla policy, but which ambiguity regarding
"directly" leads to uncertainty. Perhaps this is for a separate policy
modification (and I'll let you track that work as appropriate), but perhaps
"all accounts capable of causing certificate issuance or perform validation
functions" can clarify this?
  Item 3: "verify certificate signing requests" may also lead to ambiguity
as to whether this applies only to CSRs (which are but one way of
manifesting a certificate request) or you mean "requests for certificates"
or simply "certificate request" (omitting signing to avoid the CSR
ambiguity)

3
  - Your markdown formatting for a-c is off :)

3
  - As you reformat this, perhaps it's worth borrowing the Microsoft of
approach of mapping trust bits to criteria

4.1.2
  - You link to the "Baseline Requirements" document, but don't define what
a BR audit is. While 4.1.1 lists audit criteria, this ambiguity may be
undesirable. As with my immediately preceeding section, it may be worth
mapping "trust bits" to "accepted audits", e.g. "For CA certificates which
have the SSL trust bit set, we expect the following audits ..."
   - Similarly, when two audit schemes are interchangable, it may be worth
clarifying. For example, would Mozilla accept an ETSI TS 102 042 audit to
the DVCP profile along with a WebTrust for cAs - 2.0 audit? My hope would
be 'no', but the proposal leaves this ambiguous. https://aka.ms/auditreqs
gives a clearer idea of what I'm thinking.

4.2
  - Another a/b/c markdown formatting snafu

5.2
  - There's a thread in CA/Browser Forum regarding what an "ASN.1 DER
encoding error" is. Given 5280/X.509 describe the signature as over the DER
encoding (but that the certificate doesn't necessarily match - and see the
IETF discussion), perhaps its' worth clarifying that CAs must not _sign_
such certificates.

6
  - Is this a subset, superset, or replacement for the Baseline
Requirements?


That's a quick scan of more than enough feedback, and I figure if we start
from there, I can review the subsequent sections if/as you make
modifications.

On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 10:10 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> The next stage in the improvement of the Mozilla Root Store Policy is
> version 2.4.1. This is version 2.4, but rearranged significantly to have
> a more topic-based ordering and structure to it. I have also made
> editorial changes to clean up and clarify language, and improved the
> Markdown markup.
>
> *There is no intent to change any normative requirement in this update.*
>
> Therefore, I would appreciate people reviewing it to make sure I have
> not accidentally done so. You can find the draft here:
>
> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/blob/master/rootstore/policy.md
>
> Version 2.4, the current version, is here:
> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/blob/2.4/rootstore/policy.md
>
> The diff isn't particularly useful, but here it is:
> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/compare/2.4...master
>
> To assist with that review, below my sig is the mapping from old to new
> which I used. The old policy was split into an Intro, and then sections
> on Audit (Audit), Inclusion (Inc), Maintenance (Maint) and Enforcement
> (Enf). The mapping gives the new section name, followed by the source of
> the content from the old document in brackets. If you don't find this
> useful in your review, that's fine :-)
>
> Gerv
>
>
>
> * Introduction (Intro)
>   * Scope (Intro)
>   * Policy Ownership (Inc 13)
>
> * CCADB (Intro, Maint 5)
>
> * Certificate Authorities (Inc 4a, 6-7, Maint 1)
>
> * Documentation
>   * Audits (Audit 1-2, 7)
>   * Auditors (Audit 3-6)
>   * CP/CPS (Inc 11)
>
> * Certificates (Inc 4b, Maint 6-7)
>   * Intermediate Certificates (Inc 8-10)
>
> * Revocation (Maint 2-3)
>
> * Root Store Changes
>   * Inclusions (Inc 1-3, 5, 12)
>   * Updates (Maint 8)
>   * Removals (Enf 1-5)
>   * Transfers (Maint 4)
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
>
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