On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 7:07 AM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy <[email protected]> wrote: > On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 5:09 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: >> > 4.1.2 >> > - You link to the "Baseline Requirements" document, but don't define >> what >> > a BR audit is. While 4.1.1 lists audit criteria, this ambiguity may be >> > undesirable. As with my immediately preceeding section, it may be worth >> > mapping "trust bits" to "accepted audits", e.g. "For CA certificates >> which >> > have the SSL trust bit set, we expect the following audits ..." >> > - Similarly, when two audit schemes are interchangable, it may be >> worth >> > clarifying. For example, would Mozilla accept an ETSI TS 102 042 audit to >> > the DVCP profile along with a WebTrust for cAs - 2.0 audit? My hope would >> > be 'no', but the proposal leaves this ambiguous. >> https://aka.ms/auditreqs >> > gives a clearer idea of what I'm thinking. >> >> I've added lists of acceptable criteria beside each audit requirement. >> >> Should we simply say that a given root (and I say root, as opposed to >> 'CA') has to be covered by all-WebTrust or all-ETSI auditing? >> > > I think your new wording is still fairly unclear, and had quite a bit of > time parsing it. > > For example, 4.1.1 (7) leaves it ambiguous what "appropriate for the trust > bit(s) being applied for". 4.1.1 (4) suggests QCP is appropriate for TLS > (it isn't; it's accepted for email though?) > > Your new wording still suggests a mix and match approach, so I'd suggest: > > 4.1.2 Required Audits > > (Do all sub-CAs need to use the same scheme as the parent CA? I would > presume yes, but not clear)
I don't see why you can't mix and match, especially given the lack of clarity in the difference between "sub-CA" and "cross-signed CA". > 4.1.2.1 WebTrust > > If being audited to the criteria developed by the WebTrust Task Force of > AICPA (or is it just CPA Canada? I think it's still AICPA), the following > audits are required: Just CPA Canada. > * For the SSL trust bit, a CA and all subordinate CAs technically capable > of issuing server certificates [ref] must have all of the following: > * WebTrust for CAs - v2.0 > * WebTrust for CAs - SSL Baseline with Network Security - v2.0 > * If applying for EV recognition, a WebTrust for CAs - EV SSL v.1.4.5+ > * For the email trust bit, a CA and all subordinate CAs technically capable > of issuing email certificates [ref] must have all of the following: > * WebTrust for CAs - v2.0 > > 4.1.2.2 ETSI > > If being audited ... > > * For the SSL trust bit, a CA and all subordinate CAs ... must have all of > the following: > * ETSI TS 102 042 v.2.3.1 DVCP, OVCP, PTC-BR [note: This will shortly be > disallowed and replaced with the EN version, see how Microsoft addresses > this] > * ETSI EN 319 411-1 v1.1.1 DVCP, OVCP, PTC-BR > * For the email trust bit, a CA and all subordinate CAs ... must have: > * ETSI TS 101 456 v1.2.3 and ETSI TS 102 042 v.2.3.1 LCP, NCP, NCP+ > * or ETSI EN 319 411-1 v.1.1 and ETSI EN 319 411-2 v.2.1.1 LCP, NCP, NCP+ > > > I would suggest checking with Kathleen, but this is consistent with my > understanding of what Mozilla already requires (e.g. it's not a normative > change, it's a clarifying change) > > I'm sure you can word it and structure it better, but I think it tries to > make it clearer that trust bits map to audit criteria, rather than trying > to list criteria independent of requirements. > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

