On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 7:07 AM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 5:09 AM, Gervase Markham wrote:
>> > 4.1.2
>> >   - You link to the "Baseline Requirements" document, but don't define
>> what
>> > a BR audit is. While 4.1.1 lists audit criteria, this ambiguity may be
>> > undesirable. As with my immediately preceeding section, it may be worth
>> > mapping "trust bits" to "accepted audits", e.g. "For CA certificates
>> which
>> > have the SSL trust bit set, we expect the following audits ..."
>> >    - Similarly, when two audit schemes are interchangable, it may be
>> worth
>> > clarifying. For example, would Mozilla accept an ETSI TS 102 042 audit to
>> > the DVCP profile along with a WebTrust for cAs - 2.0 audit? My hope would
>> > be 'no', but the proposal leaves this ambiguous.
>> https://aka.ms/auditreqs
>> > gives a clearer idea of what I'm thinking.
>>
>> I've added lists of acceptable criteria beside each audit requirement.
>>
>> Should we simply say that a given root (and I say root, as opposed to
>> 'CA') has to be covered by all-WebTrust or all-ETSI auditing?
>>
>
> I think your new wording is still fairly unclear, and had quite a bit of
> time parsing it.
>
> For example, 4.1.1 (7) leaves it ambiguous what "appropriate for the trust
> bit(s) being applied for". 4.1.1 (4) suggests QCP is appropriate for TLS
> (it isn't; it's accepted for email though?)
>
> Your new wording still suggests a mix and match approach, so I'd suggest:
>
> 4.1.2 Required Audits
>
> (Do all sub-CAs need to use the same scheme as the parent CA? I would
> presume yes, but not clear)

I don't see why you can't mix and match, especially given the lack of
clarity in the difference between "sub-CA" and "cross-signed CA".

> 4.1.2.1 WebTrust
>
> If being audited to the criteria developed by the WebTrust Task Force of
> AICPA (or is it just CPA Canada? I think it's still AICPA), the following
> audits are required:

Just CPA Canada.

> * For the SSL trust bit, a CA and all subordinate CAs technically capable
> of issuing server certificates [ref] must have all of the following:
>   * WebTrust for CAs - v2.0
>   * WebTrust for CAs - SSL Baseline with Network Security - v2.0
>   * If applying for EV recognition, a WebTrust for CAs - EV SSL v.1.4.5+
> * For the email trust bit, a CA and all subordinate CAs technically capable
> of issuing email certificates [ref] must have all of the following:
>   * WebTrust for CAs - v2.0
>
> 4.1.2.2 ETSI
>
> If being audited ...
>
> * For the SSL trust bit, a CA and all subordinate CAs ... must have all of
> the following:
>   * ETSI TS 102 042 v.2.3.1 DVCP, OVCP, PTC-BR  [note: This will shortly be
> disallowed and replaced with the EN version, see how Microsoft addresses
> this]
>   * ETSI EN 319 411-1 v1.1.1 DVCP, OVCP, PTC-BR
> * For the email trust bit, a CA and all subordinate CAs ... must have:
>   * ETSI TS 101 456 v1.2.3  and ETSI TS 102 042 v.2.3.1 LCP, NCP, NCP+
>   * or ETSI EN 319 411-1 v.1.1 and ETSI EN 319 411-2 v.2.1.1 LCP, NCP, NCP+
>
>
> I would suggest checking with Kathleen, but this is consistent with my
> understanding of what Mozilla already requires (e.g. it's not a normative
> change, it's a clarifying change)
>
> I'm sure you can word it and structure it better, but I think it tries to
> make it clearer that trust bits map to audit criteria, rather than trying
> to list criteria independent of requirements.
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