Thanks. This certificate was issued by an employee of DigiCert as a test on
our systems to see if we'd resolved an issue with a path permitting CN
fields greater than 64 characters. Obviously, the issue wasn't resolved and
the JIRA is still open. We're deploying a patch shortly to fix path and
limit the string to 64 characters. All required validation was completed
successfully prior to issuing the certificate. Although we have a policy
against using live certificates for testing, the policy was not followed in
this case. Prior to issuing the certificate, we actually checked to see if
any other certificates existed with a CN length longer than 64 chars
(basically to see if this path had ever been used by a customer). There are
no other certificates with that long of common name, meaning this issue
should be resolved with the patch.

However, I think this discussion raises some very interesting points about
real world scenarios and RFC 5280 that should be addressed.  DigiCert
actually has three items that routinely show up on CABLint:
1)      Use of teletext in strings (although this only occurs in
re-issues/duplicates of previously issued certificates)
2)      Too long of fields, primarily the O and OU fields
3)      Use of underscore characters in certs
 
 We've had an open item to fix these issues for a while, but haven't
prioritized them because:
a)      From a technical standpoint, the WebPKI supports them,
b)      The inclusion of longer names reflects the real world where company
names are often longer than 64 char, especially in Europe and Asia
(translating international names to puny-code rarely results in a nice short
name),  
c)      We haven't felt that there are sufficiently significant risks
associated with the issues to spend resources addressing them considering a
and b compared to higher priorities (like our current project of requiring
only 169 validation methods), and
d)      Lots of CAs have the same or similar issues under RFC 5280 according
to CABLint, and those issues don't seem to be garnering a lot of attention
(perhaps because of higher risk issues taking priority). 
 
DigiCert and its employees observe two guiding principles in our daily
activities: 1) Improve security and 2) Support the customer. Occasionally,
these principles are not compatible.  For example, most of our customers
hate CT. However, we support the CT project because CT and publicly logging
certificates substantially improves the transparency (and thus security) of
the web. Similarly, we haven't removed underscore characters or limited the
O field to 64 characters because the risks seem insignificant compared to
the large number of companies that would not be able to obtain a
certificate. In fact, I think security is improved by providing these
certificates because these customers/domains would remain unsecured without
certificates or be forced to truncate/omit important information. I believe
most CAs have reached the same conclusion after considering the large number
of issues reported through CABLint.

The discussion also raises an interesting question of when issues become
significant enough they need to be addressed on the Mozilla list or require
revocation. For example, one of our cross-signed partners issued a large
number of certificates that lacked the proper OID. Should each of these
certs warrant a discussion and separate revocation decision? The browsers
don't do anything with this information so I'm unsure whether them revoking
all the certs (which the cross-signed partner did) and replacing them with
certs having an appropriate policy OID made a huge difference in the state
of security.  Should we start a thread on the Mozilla list about each cert
with issues detected in CABLint? Even if we assume half are false positives,
that's about 2000 new discussion items for this group. If so, can we
establish a priority ranking by the browsers for these discussions? 
 
Jeremy

-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, March 8, 2017 6:09 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: DigiCert BR violation

It appears that DigiCert has violated the Baseline Requirements, as recently
notified to the CA/Browser Forum. 

The certificate at https://crt.sh/?id=98120546 does not comply with RFC
5280.

RFC 5280 defines the upper-bound of the commonName field as 64 characters,
specifically

ub-common-name INTEGER ::= 64
-- Naming attributes of type X520CommonName:
--   X520CommonName ::= DirectoryName (SIZE (1..ub-common-name))
--
-- Expanded to avoid parameterized type:
X520CommonName ::= CHOICE {
      teletexString     TeletexString   (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
      printableString   PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
      universalString   UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
      utf8String        UTF8String      (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)),
      bmpString         BMPString       (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) }

The commonName encoded in this certificate is 67 characters
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