Thanks. This certificate was issued by an employee of DigiCert as a test on our systems to see if we'd resolved an issue with a path permitting CN fields greater than 64 characters. Obviously, the issue wasn't resolved and the JIRA is still open. We're deploying a patch shortly to fix path and limit the string to 64 characters. All required validation was completed successfully prior to issuing the certificate. Although we have a policy against using live certificates for testing, the policy was not followed in this case. Prior to issuing the certificate, we actually checked to see if any other certificates existed with a CN length longer than 64 chars (basically to see if this path had ever been used by a customer). There are no other certificates with that long of common name, meaning this issue should be resolved with the patch.
However, I think this discussion raises some very interesting points about real world scenarios and RFC 5280 that should be addressed. DigiCert actually has three items that routinely show up on CABLint: 1) Use of teletext in strings (although this only occurs in re-issues/duplicates of previously issued certificates) 2) Too long of fields, primarily the O and OU fields 3) Use of underscore characters in certs We've had an open item to fix these issues for a while, but haven't prioritized them because: a) From a technical standpoint, the WebPKI supports them, b) The inclusion of longer names reflects the real world where company names are often longer than 64 char, especially in Europe and Asia (translating international names to puny-code rarely results in a nice short name), c) We haven't felt that there are sufficiently significant risks associated with the issues to spend resources addressing them considering a and b compared to higher priorities (like our current project of requiring only 169 validation methods), and d) Lots of CAs have the same or similar issues under RFC 5280 according to CABLint, and those issues don't seem to be garnering a lot of attention (perhaps because of higher risk issues taking priority). DigiCert and its employees observe two guiding principles in our daily activities: 1) Improve security and 2) Support the customer. Occasionally, these principles are not compatible. For example, most of our customers hate CT. However, we support the CT project because CT and publicly logging certificates substantially improves the transparency (and thus security) of the web. Similarly, we haven't removed underscore characters or limited the O field to 64 characters because the risks seem insignificant compared to the large number of companies that would not be able to obtain a certificate. In fact, I think security is improved by providing these certificates because these customers/domains would remain unsecured without certificates or be forced to truncate/omit important information. I believe most CAs have reached the same conclusion after considering the large number of issues reported through CABLint. The discussion also raises an interesting question of when issues become significant enough they need to be addressed on the Mozilla list or require revocation. For example, one of our cross-signed partners issued a large number of certificates that lacked the proper OID. Should each of these certs warrant a discussion and separate revocation decision? The browsers don't do anything with this information so I'm unsure whether them revoking all the certs (which the cross-signed partner did) and replacing them with certs having an appropriate policy OID made a huge difference in the state of security. Should we start a thread on the Mozilla list about each cert with issues detected in CABLint? Even if we assume half are false positives, that's about 2000 new discussion items for this group. If so, can we establish a priority ranking by the browsers for these discussions? Jeremy -----Original Message----- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla .org] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy Sent: Wednesday, March 8, 2017 6:09 PM To: [email protected] Subject: DigiCert BR violation It appears that DigiCert has violated the Baseline Requirements, as recently notified to the CA/Browser Forum. The certificate at https://crt.sh/?id=98120546 does not comply with RFC 5280. RFC 5280 defines the upper-bound of the commonName field as 64 characters, specifically ub-common-name INTEGER ::= 64 -- Naming attributes of type X520CommonName: -- X520CommonName ::= DirectoryName (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) -- -- Expanded to avoid parameterized type: X520CommonName ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) } The commonName encoded in this certificate is 67 characters _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
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