On 23/03/2017 22:59, Walter Goulet wrote:
Hi all,
This is not directly related to Mozilla policy, CA issues or really any of the
normal discussions that I typically see in the group. However, I think that my
question may be relevant in helping to understand what a 'policy' for an
internal, non-publicly trusted PKI might look like.
While considering the problem of how to let developers, devops teams and
traditional system administrators to adequately test TLS in lab environments,
in my experience I've seen a variety of practices, some very poor, others
questionable and some that seem reasonable.
These include:
- Using externally resolvable DNS names for test/staging environments and using
certificates issued by publicly trusted CAs for testing.
- Using certificates from a 'test-only' PKI infrastructure that runs in a lab
environment, usually with little to no security controls of any kind whatsoever.
- Using self-signed certificates for testing, then finding when deploying
applications in production you end up debugging certificate path building
errors.
So a solution that I've been considering is to develop an approach for what a
'Test PKI' infrastructure should look like. At a high level, my idea for what a
secure 'Test PKI' infrastructure would look like is:
- Root CA certificate is not publicly trusted by any browsers/OSs.
- Certificates issued for test purposes may not be issued for any valid
domains, but instead may only be issued for IANA reserved domains (those
documented here:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/special-use-domain-names/special-use-domain-names.xhtml.
So if an organization called 'mycompany.com' wants to test PKI securely in
their lab, the only certificates that could be issued would be 'mycompany.test,
mycompany.local, mycompany.invalid and so on).
For this item, another practical solution is to limit it to a subdomain
of whatever domain is used for internal systems, (e.g. an AD subdomain
for Windows environments or a traditional organizational subdomain in a
non-Windows environment).
For example, if regular internal department machines are under
math.campus.example.edu, then the test machines could be under
lab3.math.campus.example.edu.
- Certificates issued for testing purposes would contain a clear 'For testing
purposes only' string in issued certificate OU fields.
- Test PKI infrastructure, while issuing test-only certificates, would still be
run as production infrastructure, meaning that proper security controls that
would be expected of any production-worthy CA are in place.
Any thoughts from the group on this approach? Note that this requires a pretty
significant mindset change in what it means to test applications/systems, most
notably because of the use of reserved, test-only domains. But I'd be really
interested in what others think.
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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