On Thursday, March 23, 2017 at 8:13:38 PM UTC-5, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> On 23/03/2017 22:59, Walter Goulet wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > This is not directly related to Mozilla policy, CA issues or really any of 
> > the normal discussions that I typically see in the group. However, I think 
> > that my question may be relevant in helping to understand what a 'policy' 
> > for an internal, non-publicly trusted PKI might look like.
> >
> > While considering the problem of how to let developers, devops teams and 
> > traditional system administrators to adequately test TLS in lab 
> > environments, in my experience I've seen a variety of practices, some very 
> > poor, others questionable and some that seem reasonable.
> >
> > These include:
> > - Using externally resolvable DNS names for test/staging environments and 
> > using certificates issued by publicly trusted CAs for testing.
> > - Using certificates from a 'test-only' PKI infrastructure that runs in a 
> > lab environment, usually with little to no security controls of any kind 
> > whatsoever.
> > - Using self-signed certificates for testing, then finding when deploying 
> > applications in production you end up debugging certificate path building 
> > errors.
> >
> > So a solution that I've been considering is to develop an approach for what 
> > a 'Test PKI' infrastructure should look like. At a high level, my idea for 
> > what a secure 'Test PKI' infrastructure would look like is:
> > - Root CA certificate is not publicly trusted by any browsers/OSs.
> > - Certificates issued for test purposes may not be issued for any valid 
> > domains, but instead may only be issued for IANA reserved domains (those 
> > documented here: 
> > https://www.iana.org/assignments/special-use-domain-names/special-use-domain-names.xhtml.
> >  So if an organization called 'mycompany.com' wants to test PKI securely in 
> > their lab, the only certificates that could be issued would be 
> > 'mycompany.test, mycompany.local, mycompany.invalid and so on).
> 
> For this item, another practical solution is to limit it to a subdomain
> of whatever domain is used for internal systems, (e.g. an AD subdomain
> for Windows environments or a traditional organizational subdomain in a
> non-Windows environment).
> 
> For example, if regular internal department machines are under
> math.campus.example.edu, then the test machines could be under
> lab3.math.campus.example.edu.
> 
> > - Certificates issued for testing purposes would contain a clear 'For 
> > testing purposes only' string in issued certificate OU fields.
> > - Test PKI infrastructure, while issuing test-only certificates, would 
> > still be run as production infrastructure, meaning that proper security 
> > controls that would be expected of any production-worthy CA are in place.
> >
> > Any thoughts from the group on this approach? Note that this requires a 
> > pretty significant mindset change in what it means to test 
> > applications/systems, most notably because of the use of reserved, 
> > test-only domains. But I'd be really interested in what others think.
> >
> 
> 
> Enjoy
> 
> Jakob
> -- 
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
> Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
> This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
> WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded



On Thursday, March 23, 2017 at 8:13:38 PM UTC-5, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> On 23/03/2017 22:59, Walter Goulet wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > This is not directly related to Mozilla policy, CA issues or really any of 
> > the normal discussions that I typically see in the group. However, I think 
> > that my question may be relevant in helping to understand what a 'policy' 
> > for an internal, non-publicly trusted PKI might look like.
> >
> > While considering the problem of how to let developers, devops teams and 
> > traditional system administrators to adequately test TLS in lab 
> > environments, in my experience I've seen a variety of practices, some very 
> > poor, others questionable and some that seem reasonable.
> >
> > These include:
> > - Using externally resolvable DNS names for test/staging environments and 
> > using certificates issued by publicly trusted CAs for testing.
> > - Using certificates from a 'test-only' PKI infrastructure that runs in a 
> > lab environment, usually with little to no security controls of any kind 
> > whatsoever.
> > - Using self-signed certificates for testing, then finding when deploying 
> > applications in production you end up debugging certificate path building 
> > errors.
> >
> > So a solution that I've been considering is to develop an approach for what 
> > a 'Test PKI' infrastructure should look like. At a high level, my idea for 
> > what a secure 'Test PKI' infrastructure would look like is:
> > - Root CA certificate is not publicly trusted by any browsers/OSs.
> > - Certificates issued for test purposes may not be issued for any valid 
> > domains, but instead may only be issued for IANA reserved domains (those 
> > documented here: 
> > https://www.iana.org/assignments/special-use-domain-names/special-use-domain-names.xhtml.
> >  So if an organization called 'mycompany.com' wants to test PKI securely in 
> > their lab, the only certificates that could be issued would be 
> > 'mycompany.test, mycompany.local, mycompany.invalid and so on).
> 
> For this item, another practical solution is to limit it to a subdomain
> of whatever domain is used for internal systems, (e.g. an AD subdomain
> for Windows environments or a traditional organizational subdomain in a
> non-Windows environment).
> 
> For example, if regular internal department machines are under
> math.campus.example.edu, then the test machines could be under
> lab3.math.campus.example.edu.
>


That's true Jakob, but I'm trying to take this process even a step further. I'm 
trying to get away from users testing with valid domains, so that even if the 
TestCA root is trusted by other users, certificates issued to it won't be valid 
for use on any external networks. That's why I'm focused on eliminating the use 
of valid TLDs in test certificates.

This is a pretty big shift from a typical testing approach, so I see some 
resistance. Is anyone aware of pitfalls when using the reserved TLDs for 
internal testing?
 
> > - Certificates issued for testing purposes would contain a clear 'For 
> > testing purposes only' string in issued certificate OU fields.
> > - Test PKI infrastructure, while issuing test-only certificates, would 
> > still be run as production infrastructure, meaning that proper security 
> > controls that would be expected of any production-worthy CA are in place.
> >
> > Any thoughts from the group on this approach? Note that this requires a 
> > pretty significant mindset change in what it means to test 
> > applications/systems, most notably because of the use of reserved, 
> > test-only domains. But I'd be really interested in what others think.
> >
> 
> 
> Enjoy
> 
> Jakob
> -- 
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
> Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
> This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
> WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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