On 28/03/17 11:02, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote:
On 27/03/17 23:12, Andrew Ayer wrote:
My interpretation of the policy is that a CA could delay disclosure for
quite some time if the sub-CA is not used to issue certificates right
away. If the sub-CA is created as a backup that is never used, the
disclosure would never need to happen.
I think this is bad.
Your case is missing the part where you explain why you think this is
bad :-) What risks are associated with undisclosed dormant sub-CA certs?
Increased attack surface. An undisclosed dormant sub-CA most likely has
its private key in an online HSM, and so I think it's prudent to assume
that it's more vulnerable (to being compromised by an attacker, or to
being accidentally used to misissue a cert) than an offline root key.
IINM, the purpose (so far) of Mozilla's intermediate cert disclosure
policy is to map the attack surface. Right?
--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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