On Thursday, 27 April 2017 00:42:20 UTC+2, Ryan Sleevi  wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 5:17 PM, okaphone.elektronika--- via
> dev-security-policy <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > If this is about the possible consequences of compromise, then I'd say you
> > should try to adres that. But please do come up with something that still
> > allows for enough flexibility, so I can arrange the HTTPS everywhere you
> > guys (browsers that is ;-) want so much. At least while there is only a
> > single CA (LetsEncrypt) that offers an alternative for wildcards for a
> > reasonable fixed price.
> >
> 
> I'm not sure your concern - there's otherwise been broad support for
> wildcards, only concerns related to the methods used to validate them to
> ensure they're meaningful.
> 
> 
> > After all the internet is also about variety isn't it? Seems to me there
> > are not all that much CA's around... I do like the LetsEncrypt initiative
> > but I also do hope they will not become the only choice. :-(
> >
> > I could live with wildcards that would only work for one DNS level for
> > instance. Would that be an improvement?
> 
> 
> They already only work for one DNS level, as a certificate. The
> authorization the CA performs, however, lets them issue wildcards for any
> number of subordinate subdomains - but only one wildcard in each, and each
> certificate only covers a single hierarchy.
> 
> I realize that the conversation may be complex here, but I think it might
> be best to simply assure you that your concerns are not misunderstood, but
> more importantly, they are unwarranted, because no one is discussing
> anything that would (negatively) impact the set of use cases you've
> described so far. It's probably just a misunderstanding as to what's being
> discussed and the subtlety of the validation points :)

Well, sorry I misunderstood then. And thanks for reassuring me. ;-)

CU Hans
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