On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 1:31 AM, Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> Wildcard certs present a level of risk that is different (higher?) than
> for other end-entity certs.‎ The risk as I see it is two-fold:
>

> 1) Issuance: Setting aside the merits of the 10 Blessed Methods, there is
> no clear way to extrapolate a successful validation for one domain into a
> plethora of FQDN's in a way that works for all scenarios. So the risk in
> this sense is that the issuer might allow a cert requester to
> over-subscribe a given domain's name space.
>

See the discussion in the CA Browser Forum regarding 3.2.2.4 and "Domain
Namespace". There's an arguable interpretation that allows for a single
domain validation and an unlimited number of certificates for an arbitrary
number of subdomains.


>
> 2) Abuse: Once the wildcard cert has been issued there is no way to check
> that the host (or FQDN) to which I'm connecting is a legitimate part of the
> broader domain or if it has been taken over for nefarious purposes. This is
> in contrast to the non-wildcard case wherein I know it's a legitimate part
> because I see the FQDN listed explicitly in the SAN field. So the risk in
> this sense is to the relying party who is less able to protect himself or
> herself from connecting to bad servers.
>

I'm not sure I understand this point. Of course it's legitimate - as it's
part of the subdomain. Could you expand further what you see as wrong here?
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