On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 1:31 AM, Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> Wildcard certs present a level of risk that is different (higher?) than > for other end-entity certs. The risk as I see it is two-fold: > > 1) Issuance: Setting aside the merits of the 10 Blessed Methods, there is > no clear way to extrapolate a successful validation for one domain into a > plethora of FQDN's in a way that works for all scenarios. So the risk in > this sense is that the issuer might allow a cert requester to > over-subscribe a given domain's name space. > See the discussion in the CA Browser Forum regarding 3.2.2.4 and "Domain Namespace". There's an arguable interpretation that allows for a single domain validation and an unlimited number of certificates for an arbitrary number of subdomains. > > 2) Abuse: Once the wildcard cert has been issued there is no way to check > that the host (or FQDN) to which I'm connecting is a legitimate part of the > broader domain or if it has been taken over for nefarious purposes. This is > in contrast to the non-wildcard case wherein I know it's a legitimate part > because I see the FQDN listed explicitly in the SAN field. So the risk in > this sense is to the relying party who is less able to protect himself or > herself from connecting to bad servers. > I'm not sure I understand this point. Of course it's legitimate - as it's part of the subdomain. Could you expand further what you see as wrong here? _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

