On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 11:58 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos via
dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>
> On 5/5/2017 9:49 μμ, Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 11:44 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos via
>> dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> Looking at https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/69
>>>
>>> do you have a proposed language that takes all comments into account?
>>> From
>>> what I understand, the Subordinate CA Certificate to be considered
>>> Technically Constrained only for S/MIME:
>>>
>>>   * MUST include an EKU that has the id-kp-emailProtection value AND
>>>   * MUST include a nameConstraints extension with
>>>       o a permittedSubtrees with
>>>           + rfc822Name entries scoped in the Domain (@example.com) or
>>>             Domain Namespace (@example.com, @.example.com) controlled by
>>>             an Organization and
>>>           + dirName entries scoped in the Organizational name and
>>> location
>>>       o an excludedSubtrees with
>>>           + a zero‐length dNSName
>>>           + an iPAddress GeneralName of 8 zero octets (covering the IPv4
>>>             address range of 0.0.0.0/0)
>>>           + an iPAddress GeneralName of 32 zero octets (covering the
>>>             IPv6 address range of ::0/0)
>>
>> Why do we need to address dNSName and iPAddress if the only EKU is
>> id-kp-emailProtection?
>>
>> Can we simplify this to just requiring at least one rfc822Name entry
>> in the permittedSubtrees?
>
>
> I would be fine with this but there may be implementations that ignore the
> EKU at the Intermediate CA level.

I've only ever heard of people saying that adding EKU at the
intermediate level breaks things, not that things ignore it.

> So, if we want to align with both the CA/B
> Forum BRs section 7.1.5 and the Mozilla Policy for S/MIME, perhaps we should
> keep the excludedSubtrees.

The BRs cover serverAuth.  If you look at
https://imagebin.ca/v/3LRcaKW9t2Qt, you will see that TCSC will end up
being two independent tests.

Thanks,
Peter
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