On 19/5/2017 6:04 μμ, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote:
On 19/05/2017 16:15, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 19/05/17 14:58, Jakob Bohm wrote:
Because the O and other dirname attributes may be shown in an e-mail
client (current or future) as a stronger identity than the technical
e-mail address.
Do you know of any such clients?
No, but it would be similar to how Fx displays that field in EV certs,
so a future Thunderbird, or a non-Mozilla client could reasonably do
something similar, even at OV level.
It doesn't have to be displayed in a client UI. It is information in the
Subject of the Certificate and Relying Parties read and decide what to
do with this information. I think we need to describe some use cases to
better understand if dirName in permittedSubtrees must be required.
One case, is issuing a TCSC for an organization so that this
organization (and possibly its affiliates) can issue personal
certificates for employees. These personal certificates, apart from
document signing/client authentication, could also be used for s/mime.
Just as section 7.1.5 of the BRs for TCSCs require a dirName present in
the permittedSubtrees, having a similar requirement for
email-constrained TCSCs reduces the risk of having end-entity
certificates that bind particular users (e.g. CN=John Doe) to an
organization (O=Very High Profile Corporation). If the TCSC was
restricted to dirName="C=XX, L=XXX, O=ACME", the risk is lower. The
administrator could still allow any e-mail address to be included in the
end-entity certificates.
Another case that was described in this thread is an e-mail provider
(such as Gmail) that wants to constrain issuance via a TCSC for
@gmail.com. However, as Gerv pointed out, they would need to allow only
information related to their customers (CN=John Doe and
[email protected]). I don't think dirName entries in
permittedSubtrees allow such a representation. If there was a way to
limit this, we would have a solution for both cases.
Are there any other cases we should consider in this discussion? IMHO,
because of the risk associated in the first use case (incorrect binding
between a natural person and an organization), TCSCs should require a
dirName.
Dimitris.
Imagine a certificate saying that [email protected] is "CN=Gervase
Markham, O=Mozilla Corporation, ST=California, CN=US", issued by a
SubCA name constrained to "@wosign.cn", but not to any range of DNs.
Surely such a certificate would be misissued? Although I guess the issue
here is that we are excluding them from scope...
So the idea would be to say that dirName had to be constrained to either
be empty (is that possible?) or to contain a dirNames validated as
correctly representing an organization owning at least one of the domain
name(s) in the cert?
Rather: It should be constrained to an X.500 subtree identifying an
organization validated to at least BR compliant OV level (EV level if
SubCA notBefore after some policy date) as for a ServerAuth certificate
for the same domain names specified in the rfc822name restrictions.
Keeps it short and simple and subject to well-understood policies.
Enjoy
Jakob
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