On 19/05/2017 16:15, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 19/05/17 14:58, Jakob Bohm wrote:
Because the O and other dirname attributes may be shown in an e-mail
client (current or future) as a stronger identity than the technical
e-mail address.
Do you know of any such clients?
No, but it would be similar to how Fx displays that field in EV certs,
so a future Thunderbird, or a non-Mozilla client could reasonably do
something similar, even at OV level.
Imagine a certificate saying that [email protected] is "CN=Gervase
Markham, O=Mozilla Corporation, ST=California, CN=US", issued by a
SubCA name constrained to "@wosign.cn", but not to any range of DNs.
Surely such a certificate would be misissued? Although I guess the issue
here is that we are excluding them from scope...
So the idea would be to say that dirName had to be constrained to either
be empty (is that possible?) or to contain a dirNames validated as
correctly representing an organization owning at least one of the domain
name(s) in the cert?
Rather: It should be constrained to an X.500 subtree identifying an
organization validated to at least BR compliant OV level (EV level if
SubCA notBefore after some policy date) as for a ServerAuth certificate
for the same domain names specified in the rfc822name restrictions.
Keeps it short and simple and subject to well-understood policies.
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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