On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 9:34 PM, Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> I even concede that that alone does create a potential for compatibility > issues should a need arise to make a global web pki-wide change to > certificate issuance (say, for example, sudden need to deprecate SHA-256 > signatures in favor of NGHA-1 [ostensibly the Next Great Hash Algorithm > Instance #1]). For mitigation of that matter, I firmly believe that any > research and development in the area of improved techniques for demonizing > server administrators would be most beneficial. > Note that global pki-wide changes are made regularly - as evidence by the CA/Browser Forum BRs :) > If I understand correctly, then, the issue is that you wish to minimize > the growth of distinct issuing systems wherever they may occur in the PKI > hierarchy, not TCSCs in particular. > That's perhaps asserting an intent, which is more than I said. I simply highlighted that security is significantly improved through the limited number of distinct issuing systems, and would be harmed by the introducing of TCSCs that introduced new and distinct issuing infrastructures. I would not seek to limit - simply, to highlight where the existing controls serve a significant and valuable security purpose, and reducing those controls would undermine that security. > > But I'm responding in the context of the desired goal, and not simply > > today's reality, since it is the goal that is far more concerning. > > If I understand correctly, your position is that full disclosure and > indexing of the TCSCs is to be desired principally because the extra effort > of doing so may discourage their prevalence in deployment? My position is that disclosure and indexing of TCSCs, and the further requirements that they be operated in accordance with the BRs (and simply audited by the Issuing CA), serves a valuable security function, for which any situation that seeks to remove those requirements should strive to provide an equivalent security function. Note that I'm being very careful in what I'm saying, for obvious non-technical reasons, and hopefully it's clear that the existing requirements serve an objective and measurable security function, and are not there to limit growth. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

