Thanks Rob.  Appreciate the links. 

-----Original Message-----
From: Rob Stradling [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Tuesday, July 4, 2017 3:50 AM
To: Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>; 
[email protected]
Subject: Re: DigiCert policy violation - non-disclosure of 
https://crt.sh/?id=160110886

Hi Jeremy.  I'm not aware of any formal definition in any RFC of the phrase 
"transitively chains".

My recollection (and Hanno's [1]) is that this terminology dates back to the 
2010 write-up of the EFF SSL Observatory [2], in which the word "transvalid" 
was coined.


[1]
https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/847-Incomplete-Certificate-Chains-and-Transvalid-Certificates.html

[2]
https://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/attachments/1777_is-the-SSLiverse-a-safe-place.pdf
Slide 29

On 03/07/17 21:59, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> Link please to a formal definition? As your email alleges a policy violation 
> by one a cross-signed CAs, we take the investigation and response very 
> seriously. I'd like to know the basis for the definition before formulating 
> an official report and potentially penalizing the Sub CA for non-compliance.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Rob Stradling [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Monday, July 3, 2017 2:14 PM
> To: Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>; 
> [email protected]
> Subject: Re: DigiCert policy violation - non-disclosure of 
> https://crt.sh/?id=160110886
> 
> On 03/07/17 16:10, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy wrote:
>> I am surprised you decided to fork the thread from here 
>> https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/sNDN6q26_uM
>>  where this was already being discussed. Seems unnecessary.
> 
> Hi Jeremy.  That thread discusses a collection of intermediate certs 
> that Tavis Ormandy found (when "crawling the pkcs7 blobs in public pdf
> files") that were not at the time known to any CT logs.  Most of those 
> intermediates did not need to be disclosed to Mozilla.
> 
> https://crt.sh/?id=160110886 was not in Tavis's collection and has not AFAICT 
> been previously discussed on this list.
> 
>> I don't agree this is a policy violation, and I doubt any CA not involved in 
>> the previously mentioned thread would even register that Mozilla may be 
>> requiring disclosure of self-signed CAs.
> 
> See this post (from another recent thread) in which Ryan Sleevi explained why 
> it makes sense to require disclosure of self-signed CA certs (for which the 
> subject public key also exists in one or more trusted cross-certificates):
> https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg
> 07049.html
> 
>> The only disclosure requirement this root may fall under is the weird 
>> "transitive" trust phrase in the policy. Note, this phrase is not defined in 
>> 5280 or the Mozilla policy. Can you please link me to the definition in an 
>> RFC? If there isn't one, until Mozilla clarifies what this means, the 
>> definition of transitive trust is vague, meaning any third interpretation is 
>> as good as the one you propose.
> 
> I think the meaning of "transitive" trust is actually quite simple.
> 
> A leaf cert (L) or intermediate cert (IC1) "transitively chains" to a root 
> (R) if it is issued by an intermediate CA whose cert (IC2) chains to R.  The 
> trust for L / IC1 is "transitive" because a relying party will only be able 
> to verify that trust under certain circumstances - i.e., the RP needs to have 
> been made aware of, and received a copy of, the IC2 cert.
> 
> If IC1 is issued directly by R, trust is "direct".  The RP is able to verify 
> that trust under all circumstances, because R is built into the application / 
> shipped with the trust store that the RP is using.
> 
>> Regardless, we will log the cert in the database pending resolution of the 
>> dispute on what this means in the Mozilla policy to avoid the debate over 
>> this particular root.
>>
>> Jeremy
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: dev-security-policy
>> [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.
>> m ozilla.org] On Behalf Of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
>> Sent: Monday, July 3, 2017 5:32 AM
>> To: [email protected]
>> <[email protected]>
>> Subject: DigiCert policy violation - non-disclosure of
>> https://crt.sh/?id=160110886
>>
>> https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures#undisclosed has listed
>> https://crt.sh/?id=160110886 for over 1 week.
>>
>> This is a violation of section 5.3.2 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy
>> v2.5 [1], which says (emphasis mine):
>> "All certificates that are capable of being used to issue new certificates, 
>> that are not technically constrained, and that directly or transitively 
>> chain to a certificate included in Mozilla’s root program MUST be audited in 
>> accordance with Mozilla’s Root Store Policy and MUST be publicly disclosed 
>> in the CCADB by the CA that has their certificate included in Mozilla’s root 
>> program. The CA with a certificate included in Mozilla’s root program MUST 
>> disclose this information *within a week* of certificate creation, and 
>> before any such subordinate CA is allowed to issue certificates."
>>
>> It's a self-signed root certificate, but nonetheless there exists a 
>> signature chain up to an included root and so disclosure is required.
>>
>>
>> [1]
>> https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-grou
>> p
>> /certs/policy/

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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