Thanks Rob. Appreciate the links. -----Original Message----- From: Rob Stradling [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, July 4, 2017 3:50 AM To: Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: Re: DigiCert policy violation - non-disclosure of https://crt.sh/?id=160110886
Hi Jeremy. I'm not aware of any formal definition in any RFC of the phrase "transitively chains". My recollection (and Hanno's [1]) is that this terminology dates back to the 2010 write-up of the EFF SSL Observatory [2], in which the word "transvalid" was coined. [1] https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/847-Incomplete-Certificate-Chains-and-Transvalid-Certificates.html [2] https://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/attachments/1777_is-the-SSLiverse-a-safe-place.pdf Slide 29 On 03/07/17 21:59, Jeremy Rowley wrote: > Link please to a formal definition? As your email alleges a policy violation > by one a cross-signed CAs, we take the investigation and response very > seriously. I'd like to know the basis for the definition before formulating > an official report and potentially penalizing the Sub CA for non-compliance. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Rob Stradling [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Monday, July 3, 2017 2:14 PM > To: Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>; > [email protected] > Subject: Re: DigiCert policy violation - non-disclosure of > https://crt.sh/?id=160110886 > > On 03/07/17 16:10, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy wrote: >> I am surprised you decided to fork the thread from here >> https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/sNDN6q26_uM >> where this was already being discussed. Seems unnecessary. > > Hi Jeremy. That thread discusses a collection of intermediate certs > that Tavis Ormandy found (when "crawling the pkcs7 blobs in public pdf > files") that were not at the time known to any CT logs. Most of those > intermediates did not need to be disclosed to Mozilla. > > https://crt.sh/?id=160110886 was not in Tavis's collection and has not AFAICT > been previously discussed on this list. > >> I don't agree this is a policy violation, and I doubt any CA not involved in >> the previously mentioned thread would even register that Mozilla may be >> requiring disclosure of self-signed CAs. > > See this post (from another recent thread) in which Ryan Sleevi explained why > it makes sense to require disclosure of self-signed CA certs (for which the > subject public key also exists in one or more trusted cross-certificates): > https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg > 07049.html > >> The only disclosure requirement this root may fall under is the weird >> "transitive" trust phrase in the policy. Note, this phrase is not defined in >> 5280 or the Mozilla policy. Can you please link me to the definition in an >> RFC? If there isn't one, until Mozilla clarifies what this means, the >> definition of transitive trust is vague, meaning any third interpretation is >> as good as the one you propose. > > I think the meaning of "transitive" trust is actually quite simple. > > A leaf cert (L) or intermediate cert (IC1) "transitively chains" to a root > (R) if it is issued by an intermediate CA whose cert (IC2) chains to R. The > trust for L / IC1 is "transitive" because a relying party will only be able > to verify that trust under certain circumstances - i.e., the RP needs to have > been made aware of, and received a copy of, the IC2 cert. > > If IC1 is issued directly by R, trust is "direct". The RP is able to verify > that trust under all circumstances, because R is built into the application / > shipped with the trust store that the RP is using. > >> Regardless, we will log the cert in the database pending resolution of the >> dispute on what this means in the Mozilla policy to avoid the debate over >> this particular root. >> >> Jeremy >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: dev-security-policy >> [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists. >> m ozilla.org] On Behalf Of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy >> Sent: Monday, July 3, 2017 5:32 AM >> To: [email protected] >> <[email protected]> >> Subject: DigiCert policy violation - non-disclosure of >> https://crt.sh/?id=160110886 >> >> https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures#undisclosed has listed >> https://crt.sh/?id=160110886 for over 1 week. >> >> This is a violation of section 5.3.2 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy >> v2.5 [1], which says (emphasis mine): >> "All certificates that are capable of being used to issue new certificates, >> that are not technically constrained, and that directly or transitively >> chain to a certificate included in Mozilla’s root program MUST be audited in >> accordance with Mozilla’s Root Store Policy and MUST be publicly disclosed >> in the CCADB by the CA that has their certificate included in Mozilla’s root >> program. The CA with a certificate included in Mozilla’s root program MUST >> disclose this information *within a week* of certificate creation, and >> before any such subordinate CA is allowed to issue certificates." >> >> It's a self-signed root certificate, but nonetheless there exists a >> signature chain up to an included root and so disclosure is required. >> >> >> [1] >> https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-grou >> p >> /certs/policy/ -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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