Hi all,

I was just reading through the baseline requirements -- specifically 3.2.2.4 
and its children -- and noted that while there are particular standards as to 
the blessed methods of validation of authority & control for domain names (and 
host names within domain names), there is nothing specified regarding the 
technical requirements for the infrastructure and procedures for this 
validation.  Instead, simple protocol names are called out as the method (like 
over HTTP/HTTPS, or establishment of TXT record in the DNS).  Nothing more 
specific is noted.

My own background is originally in software development, but specifically with 
an emphasis on network applications.  Additionally, I've been involved in quite 
a number of small / medium regional ISP interconnection matters over the years. 
 I'm extremely familiar with the various mechanisms of ISP to ISP connectivity, 
whether via purchase from a transit ISP, direct private peering over an 
independent physical link, connectivity over IXP switched infrastructure, 
whether via private VLAN, private BGP session over switched ethernet on IXP, or 
via IXP route servers, or any combination of these (very common).

It has occurred to me that a small certificate authority might plausibly have 
their principal operations infrastructure at a single data center.  Even in 
instances where multiple ISPs provide access to this CA, they will almost 
inevitably be pulled from a single data center or cluster of physically close 
data centers.  Quite frequently, those ISPs will perform regional peering 
between each other at one of a small number of data centers in the geographic 
region.

Presumably, best practice for a DNS challenge currently involves:

1.  Do the various things that negotiate between the CA and the authentication 
client what actual DNS record needs to get created (TXT record with certain 
name or similar).
2.  Client creates record and if necessary allows it to propagate in their or 
their providers' infrastructure.
3.  Client pings CA as ready for validation test.
4.  CA presumably uses a smart DNS resolver to resolve (with DNSSEC for as far 
as possible) from the IANA root to the TLD name servers to determine the 
authoritative name servers for the zone in question.
5.  Having the authoritative DNS servers now known, the CA infrastructure 
queries directly to one or more of the authoritatives for the domain to get the 
result.  Cache policy presumably is 0 or near zero.

In actuality, if that is "best practice", it falls short of handling or 
attempting to handle certain network interconnection / interception attacks 
which could definitely be mitigated significantly, though imperfectly and at 
some cost.

The trouble is that for many domains served by independent DNS infrastructure, 
you might only need to "steal" routing for a small network (say a /23) for a 
very brief period and only at the nearest major interconnection hub to the CA's 
infrastructure to briefly hijack the DNS queries from the CA infrastructure to 
the authoritative DNS servers for the registered domain.  If you know or can 
proximately control when the validation test will run within even minutes, it's 
quite possible the "route leak" wouldn't be noticed.

I should note that it is similarly possible to leak such an advertisement to 
hijack an http rather than DNS test as well.

While it will probably not be possible to guarantee that the route seen to 
certain infrastructure that a CA wishes to test control of can not be hijacked 
at all, there are definitely ways to greatly reduce the risk and significantly 
curb the number of organizations well positioned to execute such an attack.

Questions I pose:

1.  Should specific procedurals as to how one _correctly_ and via best practice 
performs the validation of effective control of a file served up on the web 
server or correctly validates a DNS challenge be part of the baseline 
requirements and/or root program requirements?

2.  What specific elements would strike the right balance of need for security 
vs cost of implementation?

3.  Are CAs today already contemplating this?  I note that code commits in 
Let's Encrypt's Boulder CA recently include the notion of remotely reached 
validation agents and coordinating the responses that the validation agents got 
and establishing rules for quorate interpretation of the results of dispersed 
validators.   I can not imagine that said work occurred in a vacuum or without 
some thought as to the kinds of risks I am speaking of.

Even if we stop short of specifying the kinds of disparate networks and 
locations that CA validation infrastructure should measure validations from, 
there are other questions I think that are appropriate to discuss:

For example, 3.2.2.4.6 mentioned validation via HTTP or HTTPS access to an FQDN 
for a given blessed path.  It never says how to fetch that or how to look up 
where to fetch it from.  It may be tempting to say "In the absence of other 
guidance, behave like a browser."  I believe, however, that this would be an 
error.  A browser would accept non-standard ports.  We should probably only 
allow 80 or 443.  A browser wouldn't load over HTTPS if the current certificate 
were untrusted.  This is presumably irrelevant to the validation check and 
should probably ignore the certificate.  An HSTS preload might well be 
incorporated into a browser, but should probably be ignored by the validator.

At the network and interconnection layer, I think there are significant 
opportunities for a bad actor to compromise domain (and email, etc, etc) 
validation in ways that parties not intimately familiar with how service 
providers interconnect and route between themselves could fail to even 
minimally mitigate.

If I am correctly reading between the lines in commit messages and capabilities 
being built into Let's Encrypt's Boulder CA software, it would appear that 
there are others concerned about the limitations inherent in single point of 
origination DNS queries being relied upon for validation purposes.  If that is 
the case, what is the appropriate forum to discuss the risks and potential 
mitigations?  If there is reasonable consensus as to those, what is the proper 
place to lobby for adoption of standards?

Thanks,

Matt Hardeman
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