Other contributors have, I think, summed up the pros and cons of the two ways forward on the specific date very effectively.
So I will expend my effort instead on pressing for Mozilla to handle final distrust of the old Symantec CA roots in its usual fashion and explicitly _not_ do as Symantec asked in leaving it enabled in the NSS trust set we know is relied upon (whether wisely or not) by lots of things other than web browsers. Once we have firm dates, I also recommend that we look for opportunities to advertise this issue and key deadline(s) to outfits like Qualys who are scanning web sites etc and reporting what they find. Regardless of any contact from Symantec, there still is no substitute for independent voices saying "This is a real problem, you need to take action by Specific Date or bad things will happen". Larger corporations will already have a process in place to assess the output of such scans, organise them by urgency and priority and get stuff done, which is what we need here, but they buy scans perhaps only once per year, so we need this to show up sooner rather than later to maximise the chance of resolution. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

