On 29/07/17 23:45, Peter Bowen wrote: > First, when the server authentication trust will bits be removed from > the existing roots. This is of notable importance for non-Firefox > users of NSS. Based on the Chrome email, it looks like they will > remove trust bits in their git repo around August 23, 2018. When will > NSS remove the trust bits?
The NSS trust store represents Mozilla's decisions about what is trustworthy. However, particularly if we match Chrome's dates, there is a slightly unusual situation as we have taken a decision on trustworthiness but, for other reasons, Firefox still trusts those certs for a period. So one might well ask, should the decision be implemented in NSS earlier than, or at the same time as, or even later than, Firefox implements it? A good question. > Second, how the dates apply to email protection certificates, if at > all. Chrome only deals with server authentication certificates, so > their decision does not cover other types of certificates. Will the > email protection trust bits be turned off at some point? Absent the bandwidth to spend more time on email-specific issues with our root store, I would expect to stop trusting all the same roots for email as well, at the same time. > Third, what the requirements are for Symantec to submit new roots, > including any limit to how many may be submitted. > https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/IncludedCACertificateReport > shows that there are currently 20 Symantec roots included. Would it > be reasonable for them to submit replacements on a 1:1 basis -- that > is 20 new roots? No. A new submission would be treated as any new submission. My guess without talking to Symantec was that they might want four roots, for a 2x2 matrix of {RSA, ECC} and {EV, non-EV}. A figure in that ballpark would be acceptable. Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

