Thanks Neil,

I've looked over the updated CP and CPS documents and have no further
comments or questions.

Cheers,

Andrew

On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 12:18 PM, Neil Dunbar via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> Andrew,
>
> SHA-1 has been removed from the TrustCor OCSP list of acceptable hash
> algorithms for responder signatures.
>
> The minimum hash deemed acceptable now is SHA-256. We have updated the
> CP/CPS in section 6.1.5 to clarify that SHA-1 will no longer be honoured as
> a signature algorithm.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Neil Dunbar
> TrustCor CA Administrator
>
>
> > On 14 Aug 2017, at 20:48, Andrew Ayer via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 20:27:05 +0100
> > Neil Dunbar via dev-security-policy
> > <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Note that TrustCor is capable of removing SHA-1 as a signature hash on
> >> OCSP responses, if the community determines it presents risk to the
> >> relying parties. However, this does raise the risk to some clients
> >> that would fail to understand the signature on the response.  We
> >> should prefer to service as many clients as faithfully as we can while
> >> remaining true to the security principles of this community.
> >
> > Yes, OCSP responses signed with SHA-1 do present a risk, since a
> > chosen prefix attack can be performed to forge OCSP responses and even
> > certificates:
> > https://www.mail-archive.com/dev-security-policy@lists.
> mozilla.org/msg02999.html
> >
> > Even if you technically constrain your OCSP responder certificates as
> > required by Mozilla policy section 5.1.1, forged OCSP responses are
> > still possible if you use SHA-1.  That would allow attackers to use
> > revoked certificates.  So it would be better if you didn't use SHA-1 at
> > all for OCSP responses.
> >
> > Thanks for your consideration of security feedback from the community.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Andrew
> > _______________________________________________
> > dev-security-policy mailing list
> > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
> > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
>
>
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