On 4-Sept-2017 we were advised through our designated revocation email address 
that we needed to examine the certificates listed below, which were issued to 
several OCSP responders using SHA1, and that we should report these to this 
list.  Thus the reason for this post.

 

We immediately contacted the operators of the issuing CAs and requested that 
they replace their OCSP responder certificates with ones signed with SHA2, and 
most have done so.  However, in drafting this post I reviewed the Baseline 
Requirements, section 7.1.3, which I think is ambiguous and allows SHA1 OCSP 
Responder Certificates in some situations.  It says, “Effective 1 January 2016, 
CAs MUST NOT issue any new Subscriber certificates or Subordinate CA 
certificates using the SHA-1 hash algorithm. CAs MAY continue to sign 
certificates to verify OCSP responses using SHA1 until 1 January 2017. This 
Section 7.1.3 does not apply to Root CA or CA cross certificates. CAs MAY 
continue to use their existing SHA-1 Root Certificates.”  (The EKU in these 
certificates indicates they are to be used for “OCSP Signing” and not “Server 
Authentication”, so it is not a matter of SSL/TLS server certificate 
misissuance.)  Most of the CAs served by these OCSP responders are legacy CAs, 
which are in the process of being retired.  For example, the Intesa Sanpaolo CA 
Servizi Esterni only has 14 active certificates, with the last one expiring 
mid-December 2017.  

 

DC=com, DC=sanpaoloimi, DC=corp, CN=Intesa Sanpaolo CA Servizi Esterni

https://crt.sh/?id=201260285 <https://crt.sh/?id=201260285&opt=cablint> 
&opt=cablint            SHA-1  (EKU:  OCSP Signing)

 

C=NL, L=Amsterdam, O=Verizon Enterprise Solutions, OU=Cybertrust, CN=Verizon 
Public SureServer CA G14-SHA1

https://crt.sh/?id=201260309 <https://crt.sh/?id=201260309&opt=cablint> 
&opt=cablint            SHA-1  (EKU:  OCSP Signing)

 

C=NL, L=Amsterdam, O=Verizon Enterprise Solutions, OU=Cybertrust, CN=Verizon 
Public SureCodeSign CA G14-SHA1

https://crt.sh/?id=201260337 <https://crt.sh/?id=201260337&opt=cablint> 
&opt=cablint            SHA-1  (EKU:  OCSP Signing)

 

C=NL, L=Amsterdam, O=Verizon Enterprise Solutions, OU=Cybertrust, CN=Verizon 
Akamai SureServer CA G14-SHA1

https://crt.sh/?id=201260459 <https://crt.sh/?id=201260459&opt=cablint> 
&opt=cablint            SHA-1    (EKU:  OCSP Signing)

 

CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação 
Electrónica do Estado, C=PT

https://crt.sh/?id=201260500 <https://crt.sh/?id=201260500&opt=cablint> 
&opt=cablint            SHA-1    (EKU:  OCSP Signing)

 

C=PT, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação Electrónica do Estado, OU=ECEstado, 
CN=Cartão de Cidadão 002

https://crt.sh/?id=201260501 <https://crt.sh/?id=201260501&opt=cablint> 
&opt=cablint            SHA-1  (EKU:  OCSP Signing)

 

O="Cybertrust, Inc", CN=Cybertrust Global Root

https://crt.sh/?id=201186966 <https://crt.sh/?id=201186966&opt=cablint> 
&opt=cablint            pathLenConstraint with CA:FALSE   (EKU:  OCSP Signing)

 

We look forward to your response and  comments.

 

Ben Wilson

DigiCert VP of Compliance

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