I concur in full with Nick Lamb's comments and positions on this matter. There is no reasonable short cut to actually doing the DNSSEC thing if we want to usefully intertwine those technologies at all.
There IS significant benefit in enforcing complete DNSSEC validation for (all) the domain validation DNS queries where DNSSEC has been configured for the relevant zones. This is especially the case for CAA records, which have an explicit security function: controlling, at a minimum, who may issue publicly trusted certificates for a given FQDN. I will note that from the software development perspective, I concede that many of the DNS query APIs don't surface (at least in a friendly way) exactly what the nature of the DNSSEC validation failure is or at what layer of delegation the validation fails. My position is that ultimately, that doesn't really matter: If a CA wanted a quick and easy path to differentiating whether a domain has a DNSSEC problem or a CAA problem, chase the queries from the root down both with DNSSEC validation on and with DNSSEC validation off. If no errors arise (because DNSSEC is not configured, etc) then rely on the CAA records alone. If, however, a DNSSEC validated response comes back but errors exist on DNSSEC enabled queries for the CAA records, presume there's a DNSSEC problem of some sort and let the DNS / site admin work out the specific failure. Alternatively, do further digging for the mode of failure outside of the issuance path, in a separate after-adverse-decisioning debug / diagnostic path. It is undeniable that DNSSEC validated query resolution takes longer than queries without DNSSEC. Regardless, these are not terribly lengthy. If the finding is that they are lengthy, reduce the local max timeout for whatever phases are taking too long. I'm having trouble understanding how even several seconds of (asynchronous) delay can be a factor of great concern for a commercial CA. I would assume that all kinds of checks are going on in parallel with callbacks hitting and the certificate advancing to signing when all the necessary callbacks have updated the test status to good. I'm certain that one absolutely could build such a set of asynchronous work queues which would perform tests in a significantly parallel fashion for a great many pending certificates and then push each pending certificate to the actual signer in the moment that the last callback for a given required test posts GOOD on a particular pending issue. Let them process out-of-order prior to hitting the signer, submitting to the final FIFO signing queue in the instant that the last test which clears the issuance decisions transitions to positive. I'd like to comment that DNSSEC and CAA in combination are, to my mind, the only presently available solution of an unambiguous nature for prevention of fraudulent domain-validation success results in a world where a significantly connected BGP participant might hijack ones IP space. On this basis, I assert that there is real and distinct value in enforcing the sanctity of CAA or sanctity of lack of CAA via DNSSEC validation wherever DNSSEC has been configured. Without managing to hoodwink the TLD registry or associated TLD registrar for a domain, there is no way for a successful IP space hijack to yield manipulated results to DNS queries answered by authoritatives in said hijacked IP space -- if and only if DNSSEC validation is performed. I put forth that the security of the root zone delegation, and delegation from the TLD registrar/registry to the authoritative zone IS or CAN BE far more secure than DNS queries without cryptographic validation in a world where the IP space underpinning an authoritative DNS server can be (fairly) easily hijacked. For what it's worth, I'd also LOVE to see an extension option to CAA records which standardize ways of indicating acceptable domain validation methodologies along with acceptable CAs. For example, it would be nice to be able to say "Allow only Let's Encrypt to issue; Allow issuance only when domain validation mechanism relies exclusively upon DNS". In this environment, even if someone hijacks the IP space of a web server within the domain, they are unable to get a certificate issued because they can't skip the CAA and the DNSSEC is keeping the issuance from occurring because it requires a DNS proof for issuance, rather than allowing the random-verification-content-in-a-well-known-url validation. Just my thoughts on the matter... Thanks, Matt Hardeman _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

