Has there been any serious discussion of the potential benefit of CAA reporting for certificate issuance attempts?
I'm aware of what the spec says and the SHOULD language, etc... I'm not a CA and don't represent one. I do, however, think that it's easier to get buy-in for changes to CA infrastructure when there is a strong showing for cost/benefit relationship. In a post-CT world, issuances which occur will be easily detected quite promptly. I am unsure of the value of a report issuing for a failed issuance attempt. "Oh, yea, that wasn't me. Someone's looking to attack." How does that help? One should always assume that one is under attack. Perhaps it allows you to identify an internal party attempting to get a certificate issued and allows you to work with that party to correctly get a certificate issued, but wouldn't that legitimate inside party have reached out internally anyway when they encountered a problem? I'm just not sure I understand the point of the reporting in terms of deriving real security value. I think it behooves the community, in selecting items to advance for mandatory compliance within the CA space, to choose the requirements imposed carefully and with a view to deriving real objective security value. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

