With respect to the action item, I'll add it to next week's VWG agenda.

-Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Doug Beattie [mailto:doug.beat...@globalsign.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 24, 2018 11:02 AM
> To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.holleb...@digicert.com>; Rob Stradling
> <rob.stradl...@comodo.com>; Jonathan Rudenberg
> <jonat...@titanous.com>; mozilla-dev-security-policy
<mozilla-dev-security-
> pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
> Subject: RE: GlobalSign certificate with far-future notBefore
> 
> Can we consider this case closed with the action that the VWG will propose
a
> ballot that addresses pre and postdating certificates?
> 
> Doug
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> > bounces+doug.beattie=globalsign....@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> > bounces+Tim
> > Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 24, 2018 11:49 AM
> > To: Rob Stradling <rob.stradl...@comodo.com>; Jonathan Rudenberg
> > <jonat...@titanous.com>; mozilla-dev-security-policy
> > <mozilla-dev-security- pol...@lists.mozilla.org>
> > Subject: RE: GlobalSign certificate with far-future notBefore
> >
> >
> > > > This incident makes me think that two changes should be made:
> > > >
> > > > 1) The Root Store Policy should explicitly ban forward and
> > > > back-dating
> > the
> > > notBefore date.
> > >
> > > I think it would be reasonable and sensible to permit back-dating
> > > insofar
> > as it is
> > > deemed necessary to accommodate client-side clock-skew.
> >
> > Indeed.  This was discussed at a previous Face to Face meeting, and it
> > was generally agreed that a requirement that the notBefore date be
> > within +-1 week of issuance would not be unreasonable.
> >
> > The most common practice is backdating by a few days for the reason
> > Rob mentioned.
> >
> > -Tim

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