When I wrote CAA, my intention was for it to apply to SSL/TLS certs only. I did 
not consider S/MIME certs to be relevant precisely because of the 
al...@gmail.com problem.

I now realize that was entirely wrong and that there is in fact great utility 
in allowing domain owners to control their domains (or not).

If gmail want to limit the issue of Certs to one CA, fine. That is a business 
choice they have made. If you want to have control of your online identity, you 
need to have your own personal domain. That is why I have hallambaker.com. All 
my mail is forwarded to gmail.com but I control my identity and can change mail 
provider any time I want.

One use case that I see as definitive is to allow paypal to S/MIME sign their 
emails. That alone could take a bite out of phishing. 

But even with gmail, the only circumstance I could see where a mail service 
provider like that would want to restrict cert issue to one CA would be if they 
were to roll out S/MIME with their own CA.
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