In light of the limited visibility of WHOIS, Wayne's suggestion of "... allow anyone to revoke by proving that they control the domain name using one of the BR 3.2.2.4 methods" is preferable as it is a bit more encompassing rather than restricting to to same validation process. This also supports the idea of transparency around revocation processes. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Namecheap refused to revoke certificate despite domain owner changed
Joanna Fox via dev-security-policy Fri, 01 Jun 2018 14:06:30 -0700
- Re: Namecheap refused to revoke c... Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
- Re: Namecheap refused to rev... Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
- RE: Namecheap refused to... Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
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- Re: Namecheap refused to rev... Richard S. Leung via dev-security-policy
- Re: Namecheap refused to rev... Richard S. Leung via dev-security-policy
- Re: Namecheap refused to rev... Richard S. Leung via dev-security-policy