W dniu piątek, 18 stycznia 2019 18:44:23 UTC+1 użytkownik Jakob Bohm napisał:
> On 17/01/2019 21:12, Wayne Thayer wrote:
> > Hello Piotr,
> > 
> > On Thu, Jan 17, 2019 at 6:23 AM Grabowski Piotr <piotr.grabow...@kir.pl>
> > wrote:
> > 
> >> Hello Wayne,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I am very sorry for the  delay. Please find below our answers to Ryan's
> >> questions. Regarding the question why we didn't report this misissuance
> >> of this 1 certificate as separate incident in my opinion it is still the
> >> same incident. I can create new incident if you want me to. Taking into
> >> account my email and Ryan's response I assumed it is not required to
> >> create separate incident for  misissuance of this 1 certificate.
> >>
> >>
> >> I am not so concerned about creating a new bug and/or a new email thread.
> > My concern is that you did not report the new misissuance even though you
> > appear to have known about it. Why was it not reported as part of the
> > existing incident, and what is being done to ensure that future
> > misissuances - either in relation to existing or new incidents - are
> > promptly reported?
> > 
> > So our comments in blue:
> >>
> >>
> >> I don't think it's reasonable to push the problem to your CA software
> >> vendor.
> >>
> >> - We are not pushing the problem to CA software vendor. I have just tried
> >> to explain how it happened.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> If Verizon does not provide this support, what steps will your CA take?
> >>
> >> - We are almost sure that Verizon will provide at least policy field
> >> validation for maximum field size which can be sufficient to eliminate
> >> the last gap in our policy templates which in turn led us to misissuance
> >> of this certificate. If Verizon will not provide this feature we will be 
> >> considering
> >> usage of another UniCERT component - ARM plug-in - which analyzes
> >> requests but this means custom development for us. It would be a big
> >> change in many processes and the challange to preserve current security
> >> state as well so this should be an absolute last resort.
> >>
> >>
> >> If you know what those steps are, is there reason not to take them now? If
> >> you do not know what those steps are, when will you know?
> >>
> >> The main reason why we are not taking these steps now (changing processes
> >> and custom development) is absolute conviction that the cost and the risk 
> >> of
> >> implementing them is much, much higher that the risk related with waiting
> >> for that feature being delivered by vendor.  Just to recall, now we have
> >> the only gap which in the worst case can give us specific field in
> >> certificate longer than RFC specifies. Of course we are practicing due care
> >> and have put as much counter-measures as we can (procedure, labels above
> >> the fields).
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Your software is producing invalid and improper certificates. The
> >> responsibility for that ultimately falls on the CA, and understanding what
> >> steps the CA is taking to prevent that is critical. It appears that the
> >> steps, today, rely on human factors. As the past year of incident reports
> >> have shown, relying solely on human factors is not a reasonable practice.
> >>
> >> -I agree entirely with you, that's why we will keep exerting pressure on
> >> Verizon to deliver:
> >>
> >> o   Policy field size validation – in our opinion it is simple change 
> >> request and should be delivered ASAP.
> >>
> >> o   native x509lint or zlint feature
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > When can we expect an update from you on Verizon's response to your
> > request? If I was the customer, I would expect a prompt response from
> > Verizon.
> > 
> 
> Additional questions:
> 
> - Is this the same CA software that was used on Verizon's own CA or
>   SubCA, which had serious problem some time ago?
> 
> - Who else (besides KIR) is still using this software to run a public
>   CA?
> 
> 
> Enjoy
> 
> Jakob
> -- 
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
> Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
> This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
> WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded

Hello Jacob,
Could you give me the link to the incident with Verizon software you're talking 
about?
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