I don't think that it's trivial for less-skilled user to obtain the CSR of "DigiCert Global Root G2" certificate and posting it in the request of another certificate, right?
On 15-Apr-19 6:57 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > Thanks for the explanation. > > Is it possible that a significant percentage of less-skilled users > simply pasted in the wrong certificates by mistake, then wondered why > their new certificates newer worked? > > Pasting in the wrong certificate from an installed certificate chain or > semi-related support page doesn't seem an unlikely user error with that > design. > > On 12/04/2019 18:56, Jeremy Rowley wrote: >> I don't mind filling in details. >> >> We have a system that permits creation of certificates without a CSR >> that works by extracting the key from an existing cert, validating >> the domain/org information, and creating a new certificate based on >> the contents of the old certificate. The system was supposed to do a >> handshake with a server hosting the existing certificate as a form of >> checking control over the private key, but that was never >> implemented, slated for a phase 2 that never came. We've since >> disabled that system, although we didn't file any incident report >> (for the reasons discussed so far). >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: dev-security-policy >> <dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org> On Behalf Of Wayne >> Thayer via dev-security-policy >> Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 10:39 AM >> To: Jakob Bohm <jb-mozi...@wisemo.com> >> Cc: mozilla-dev-security-policy >> <mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org> >> Subject: Re: Arabtec Holding public key? [Weird Digicert issued cert] >> >> It's not clear that there is anything for DigiCert to respond to. Are >> we asserting that the existence of this Arabtec certificate is proof >> that DigiCert violated section 3.2.1 of their CPS? >> >> - Wayne >> >> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 6:57 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < >> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >> >>> On 11/04/2019 04:47, Santhan Raj wrote: >>>> On Wednesday, April 10, 2019 at 5:53:45 PM UTC-7, Corey Bonnell wrote: >>>>> On Wednesday, April 10, 2019 at 7:41:33 PM UTC-4, Nick Lamb wrote: >>>>>> (Resending after I typo'd the ML address) >>>>>> >>>>>> At the risk of further embarrassing myself in the same week, while >>>>>> working further on mimicking Firefox trust decisions I found this >>>>>> pre-certificate for Arabtec Holding PJSC: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://crt.sh/?id=926433948 >>>>>> >>>>>> Now there's nothing especially strange about this certificate, >>>>>> except that its RSA public key is shared with several other >>>>>> certificates >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8bb593a93be1d0e8a822bb887c547890c3e706aad2d >>> ab76254f97fb36b82fc26 >>>>>> >>>>>> ... such as the DigiCert Global Root G2: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://crt.sh/?caid=5885 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I would like to understand what happened here. Maybe I have once >>>>>> again made a terrible mistake, but if not surely this means either >>>>>> that the Issuing authority was fooled into issuing for a key the >>>>>> subscriber doesn't actually have or worse, this Arabtec Holding >>>>>> outfit has the private keys for DigiCert's Global Root G2 >>>>>> >>>>>> Nick. >>>>> >>>>> AFAIK there's no requirement in the BRs or Mozilla Root Policy for >>>>> CAs >>> to actually verify that the Applicant actually is in possession of the >>> corresponding private key for public keys included in CSRs (i.e., >>> check the signature on the CSR), so the most likely explanation is >>> that the CA in question did not check the signature on the >>> Applicant-submitted CSR and summarily embedded the supplied public key >>> in the certificate (assuming Digicert's CA infrastructure wasn't >>> compromised, but I think that's highly unlikely). >>>>> >>>>> A very similar situation was brought up on the list before, but >>>>> with >>> WoSign as the issuing CA: >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/zECd9J3KBW >>> 8/OlK44lmGCAAJ >>>>> >>>> >>>> While not a BR requirement, the CA's CPS does stipulate validating >>> possession of private key in section 3.2.1 (looking at the change >>> history, it appears this stipulation existed during the cert >>> issuance). So something else must have happened here. >>>> >>>> Except for the Arabtec cert, the other certs looks like cross-sign >>>> for >>> the Digicert root. >>>> >>> >>> Why still no response from Digicert? Has this been reported to them >>> directly? >>> > > > Enjoy > > Jakob _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
