On Wed, Jul 10, 2019 at 2:41 PM housley--- via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On Friday, July 5, 2019 at 7:53:45 PM UTC-4, Wayne Thayer wrote: > > Based on this discussion, I propose adding the following statement to the > > Mozilla Forbidden Practices wiki page [1]: > > > > ** Logotype Extension ** > > Due to the risk of misleading Relying Parties and the lack of defined > > validation standards for information contained in this field, as > discussed > > here [2], CAs MUST NOT include the RFC 3709 Logotype extension in CA or > > Subscriber certificates. > > > > Please respond if you have concerns with this change. As suggested in > this > > thread, we can discuss removing this restriction if/when a robust > > validation process emerges. > > > > - Wayne > > > > [1] https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Forbidden_or_Problematic_Practices > > [2] > > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/nZoK5akw2c8/ZtF0WZY8AgAJ > > People find logos very helpful. That is why many browsers display a tiny > logo in the toolbar. > > I would suggest that a better way forward is to start the hard work on the > validation process. It will not be difficult for that to become more > robust and accessible than the logos in the toolbar. > [I am not currently employed by a CA. Venture Cryptography does not operate one or plan to.] I agree with Russ. The Logotype extension has technical controls to protect the integrity of the referenced image by means of a digest value. I do find the discussion of the usability factors rather odd when I am looking at my browser tabs decorated with completely unauthenticated favicons. Why is it that browser providers have no problem putting that information in front of users? If Mozilla or Chrome or the like don't see the value of using the logotype information, don't. But if you were to attempt to prevent others making use of this capability, that looks a lot like anti-Trust to me. The validation scheme I proposed when we discussed this some years back was to build on the Madrid Treaty for registration of trademarks. International business is already having to deal with the issue of logos being used in multiple jurisdiction. It is a complex, difficult problem but one that the international system is very much aware of and working to address. They will take time but we can leave the hard issues to them. I see multiple separate security levels here: 1) Anyone can create a Web page that appears to look like Ethel's Bank 2) Ethel's Bank Carolina and Ethel's Bank Spain both have trademarks in their home countries and can register credentials showing they are Ethel's Bank. 3) When someone goes to Ethel's Bank online they are assured that it is the canonical Ethel's Bank and no other. There are obvious practical problems that make (3) unreachable. Not least the fact that one of the chief reasons that trademarks are often fractured geographically is that they were once part of a single business that split. Cadbury's chocolate sold in the US is made by a different company to that sold in the UK which is why some people import the genuine article at significant expense. But the security value lies in moving from level 1 to level 2. Stopping a few million Internet thieves easily setting up fake web sites that look By Ethel's bank is the important task. The issue of which Ethel's Bank is the real one is something they can sort out (expensively) between themselves, 20 paces with loaded lawyers. For the record, I am not sure that we can graft logotypes onto the current Web browser model as it stands. I agree with many of Ryan's criticisms, but not his conclusions. Our job is to make the Internet safe for the users. I am looking at using logotypes but in a very different interaction model. The Mesh does have a role for CAs but it is a very different role. I will be explaining that model elsewhere. But the basic idea here is that the proper role of the CA is primarily as an introducer. One of the reasons the Web model is fragile today is that every transaction is essentially independent as far as the client is concerned. The server has cookies that link the communications together but the client starts from scratch each time. So imagine that I have a Bookmarks catalog that I keep my financial service providers in and this acts as a local name provider for all of my Internet technology. When I add Ethel's bank to my Bookmarks catalog, I see the Ethel's bank logo as part of that interaction. A nice big fat logo, not a small one. And I give it my pet name 'Ethel'. And when I tell Siri, or Alexa or Cortana, 'call ethel', it call's Ethel's bank for me. Or if I type 'Ethel' into a toolbar, that is the priority. Given where we have come from, the CA will have to continue to do the trust management part of the WebPKI indefinitely. And I probably want the CA to also have the role of warning me when a party I previously trusted has defaulted in some way. Putting the logo in the user's face every time they go to a Web site is going to be problematic usability wise. Doing that when they sign up is a very different matter. I have also been looking at one of the solutions proposed for stopping phishing and taken it to an extreme. This is the idea of a limited Web browser that is only used for the important parts of a bank or brokerage site. Confirming trades or bill payments, etc. And I cut down the browser again and again until all I was left with was a browser where the site could ask 'Do you want to do X' and the user could respond yes or no. This is a browser I can fit on my watch and yes, I want the logo of the party asking the question. Since leaving Comodo last year, I have rethought every part of the Internet security infrastructure. The result is described here: http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture.html _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy