Here are the proposed changes: * Reinstate Mozilla's revocation requirements for S/MIME certificates: https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/e6337bb76a4522da15aeb7c0862b6cc05d317814 (replacing the original 2.7 proposal with the older Root Store policy requirements) * Require revocation when a certificate violates our Root Store policy: https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/fbe5c4f7b78bd4572632ce411a758eba1acf04ef (note: I've already fixed the typo)
As always, I will appreciate everyone's review or and comments on this proposal. - Wayne On Wed, Oct 2, 2019 at 4:00 PM Wayne Thayer <wtha...@mozilla.com> wrote: > Thank you for the comments Dimitris. I think you make a valid point in > general that S/MIME certificates are quite different from TLS certificates, > and applying the BR rules to them might not be appropriate. I expect this > to ultimately be sorted out by the CAB Forum's future S/MIME Working Group, > but in the interim we still need some reasonable Mozilla policy. This leads > me to conclude that the best solution might be to do as Kathleen suggested > and reinstate the old Mozilla revocation requirements (prior to referencing > the BRs) to apply to S/MIME certificates: > https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/blob/2.4.1/rootstore/policy.md#6-revocation > The biggest change here from my earlier proposal would be that no > revocation timeline would be specified. > > I also suggest that we add a requirement for both TLS and S/MIME > certificates that states the CA must revoke a certificate that "does not > comply with the version of this policy that was in effect at the time it > was issued.". Currently, there is no hard requirement for CAs to revoke > certificates that comply with the BRs but not with our own policy (e.g. use > of the P-521 algorithm [1]). > > How do these changes sound to everyone? > > - Wayne > > [1] > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/4gs5pKqTeK8/_eJvekr1BgAJ > > On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 10:43 PM Dimitris Zacharopoulos via > dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> >> Dear Wayne, >> >> Please consider the fact that S/MIME is focused on "signature" >> Certificates which has different considerations than "authentication" >> Certificates. The baseline requirements (and their revocation >> requirements) are focused on "authentication" Certificates. I believe >> the revocation policies, at least for the CA Certificates, do not align >> well with S/MIME. >> >> When a piece of data is "signed" (such as an e-mail), Relying Parties >> need to be able to verify the status of the signing Certificate _when >> the signature was created_. If the Issuing CA is revoked, it is no >> longer able to provide status information for that Certificate. If we >> think about the serial number issue, if a CA had to be revoked, status >> information for its issued Certificates would discontinue leading >> Relying Parties to have difficulties validating the existing signed >> e-mails that were valid when signed. >> >> This might be something to consider more carefully. >> >> >> Thank you, >> Dimitris. >> >> >> On 15/5/2019 3:25 π.μ., Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy wrote: >> > On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 11:21 AM Kathleen Wilson via >> dev-security-policy < >> > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >> > >> >> On 5/10/19 5:46 PM, Wayne Thayer wrote: >> >>> I've attempted to update section 6 to incorporate revocation >> requirements >> >>> for S/MIME certificates: >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/15ad5b9180903b92b8f638c219740c0fb6ba0637 >> >>> Note: since much of this language is copied directly from the BRs, if >> we >> >>> decide to adopt it, the policy will also need to comply with the >> Creative >> >>> Commons Attribution 4.0 International license used by the BRs. >> >>> >> >>> I will greatly appreciate everyone's review and comments on this >> proposed >> >>> change. >> >> >> >> The proposed changes look OK to me. >> >> >> >> But I would also be fine with the new section 6.2 regarding revocation >> >> of S/MIME certs just re-using the revocation text that we used to have >> >> in our policy (which had been removed in an effort to remove redundancy >> >> with the BRs). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/blob/2.4.1/rootstore/policy.md#6-revocation >> >> >> >> >> > The 'reasons for revocation' from the old policy are very close to the >> BR >> > language I proposed. The main difference in my proposal is the >> inclusion of >> > deadlines by which certificates must be revoked (same as in the BRs). >> While >> > the BR deadlines have sometimes been challenging, I do feel that we're >> > better off to have them as our standard and handle exceptions as >> incidents, >> > so my preference is to stick with my proposal. >> > _______________________________________________ >> > dev-security-policy mailing list >> > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org >> > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy >> >> _______________________________________________ >> dev-security-policy mailing list >> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org >> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy >> > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
