[ Please follow up to mozilla.dev.tech.crypto ]
After some discussion at bug 554594 I'm following up here - the bug was
unfortunately misused by me a little for the initial discussion.
At https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security:Renegotiation under item 4.4 the
following is proposed:
security.ssl.require_safe_negotiation
If set to true, a Mozilla client will reject *all* connection
attempts to servers that are still using the old SSL/TLS protocol
and which might be vulnerable to the attack.
I believe this to be a mistake for various reasons, but first and
foremost because an attack on a server without compromise of the client
data as well, is basically useless. When a attacker induces
renegotiation at the server, the attacker must have client credentials
in order to act as if he were the original client. Without those
credentials, the attacker would be treated as any other unauthenticated
source.
When a client (as in our case Firefox) implements RFC 5746, the client
can't be compromised and no data is leaked from the client. I propose
that Firefox should support the RFC 5746 extension exclusively, but NOT
block or warn on accessing servers which don't support the extension.
Any renegotiation attempt to the client will be ignored and no data is
leaked.
The advantage for this approach would be earlier support of RFC 5746
which would facilitate safe renegotiation with servers that support it,
but still allows to support servers which don't support it.
SSLv2 was disabled in Firefox only a short while ago, despite the fact
that newer protocols were available for most of the last 14 years. I
expect that it will take years upon years until 90% of all SSL enabled
servers will support RFC 5746, not speaking about 99% or higher.
Refusing to speak to servers that don't support RFC 5746 - even if the
sites probably never need renegotiation - will have an undesired effect,
either by breaking SSL entirely or forcing the user to accept unsafe
renegotiation, which will leave the user vulnerable once again.
It also must be noted that 99% or more of all SSL enabled web sites will
never need renegotiation to work. A server which disabled renegotiation
is at least as secure as a server supporting the new extension. Those
that need it will probably patch their servers sooner or later and are
not a concern IMO.
--
Regards
Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd.
XMPP: start...@startcom.org
Blog: http://blog.startcom.org/
Twitter: http://twitter.com/eddy_nigg
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