On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:36 AM, ptheriault <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mar 15, 2012, at 12:16 PM, lkcl luke wrote: > >> Some time ago, Paul wrote this: >> >>> How do domains which install themselves as Web Apps fit into this model? Is >>> there perhaps a default lower set of permissions that websites can install >>> themselves with - basically the same types as websites, except that with >>> apps permissions might be able t get "prompt to remember" instead of just >>> "prompt"?) >> >> paul, hi, >> >> what do you mean "domains which install themselves as Web Apps?" > > Pages which call navigator.mozApps.install(<their own URL>) rather than be > installed from a trusted store.
ahh right, ok. does this function allow writing to the local filesystem? if so, does it allow *overwriting* of existing files? if so, what protection is there? (i.e. is there a specification page which describes this function) it sounds to me like this function is intended to be the equivalent of dpkg/aptitude, would that be a fair but rough / approximate assessment? > I believe that the idea is that they just won't be a trusted store, so they > won't get sensitive permissions. Response from a previous email was: > >>Such store's generally won't be trusted. So those stores will work >>just fine, however they won't be able to install apps which need SMS >> privileges. > > I.e. this wouldn't be for internal phone apps (gaia-esque) but for more web > page style apps, that want the installed app user experience, but don't need > sensitive permissions and so don't need to go through a store. Or that is how > I understood it. *huffs*. if this function is a functional-equivalent of dpkg/aptitude, it has *deep breath* one hell of a lot of catching up to do. aptitude takes care of conflicts as well as dependencies; dpkg takes care of file-conflicts and such. so if there are two packages that accidentally have the same filename (which is not permitted and is a severe violation of debian package policy), dpkg will notify you and bomb out rather than let you proceed. bottom line is: without looking closely at it, navigator.mozApps.install is making me nervous :) > I'll make a note on this in the wiki. yeay! :) if there's a spec for navigator.mozApps.install is there any chance you could add a link to it there, too, so it can be reviewed? l. _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security
