Is there any special risk on allowing any kind of unauthenticated content
to request vibration without any permission request?

Thanks, best

El 16/04/12 07:55, "Lucas Adamski" <[email protected]> escribió:

>Last call for comments!  So far the only feedback I have received is that
>it would be good to have a UI mechanism for determine which app is
>triggering the vibration, which sounds like a reasonable idea to me.
>Thanks!
>  Lucas.
>
>On Apr 11, 2012, at 10:36 PM, Lucas Adamski wrote:
>
>> Name of API: Vibration
>> Reference: http://dev.w3.org/2009/dap/vibration/
>>
>> Brief purpose of API: Let content activate the vibration motor
>>
>> Inherent threats: Obnoxious if mis-used, consume extra battery
>> Threat severity: low
>>
>> == Regular web content (unauthenticated) ==
>> Use cases for unauthenticated code: Vibrate when hit in a game
>> Authorization model for uninstalled web content: Explicit
>> Authorization model for installed web content: Implicit
>> Potential mitigations: Limit how long vibrations can run
>>
>> == Trusted (authenticated by publisher) ==
>> Use cases for authenticated code:[Same]
>> Authorization model: Implicit
>> Potential mitigations:
>>
>> == Certified (vouched for by trusted 3rd party) ==
>> Use cases for certified code:
>> Authorization model: implicit
>> Potential mitigations:
>>
>> Notes:  This API may be implicitly granted.  User can deny from
>>Permission Manager to over-ride an abusive app.
>>
>
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