The assumption in NSS in the past has been that certUsageEmailSigner implied non-repudiation, while certUsageSSLClientAuth did not.

That being said, NSS does not currently filter either of those based on the non-repudiation bit (IIRC). Also, there is a growing suspicion that email should be signed with a 'auth' certificate, since it typically means 'I sent this', not 'I agree to this'. The quickest way to come to that conclusion is to ask yourself "do I really want to supply may pin again each time I try to send an email message"?

If we go down this new path, it would imply that we need a new certUsage for non-repudiation certificates.

bob

Anders Rundgren wrote:
Odd that crypto.signtext should check for an email cert when it is not
performing email signing or encryption.
nsCrypto::SignText explicitly does a
CERT_FindUserCertsByUsage(certUsageEmailSigner); is there a better usage
bit to use?
There's no better usage bit to use, I know this the hard way :-)

Although I have not studied the code, the name appears to be in conflict with
websigning since such certificates usually has nothing to do with e-mail.

The appropriate selection should only check for NR or have I missed something 
obvious?
Maybe it could be extended to support the DS in the case there is no NR cert
with the same "ID"?  This comparison is a bit ugly but may be needed for PIV.

Anders Rundgren

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