Hi again Bob,
(saw you at the NIST PKI Workshop last week)

>The assumption in NSS in the past has been that certUsageEmailSigner 
>implied non-repudiation, while certUsageSSLClientAuth did not.

I believe this is perfectly OK.  It was just the name that caught my attention.
It sounds like it looks for other things than just the non-rep stuff.

>That being said, NSS does not currently filter either of those based on 
>the non-repudiation bit (IIRC). Also, there is a growing  suspicion that 
>email should be signed with a 'auth' certificate, since it typically 
>means 'I sent this', not 'I agree to this'. The quickest way to come to 
>that conclusion is to ask yourself  "do I really want to supply may pin 
>again each time I try to send an email message"?

To my knowledge, CAs either issue separate NR and Auth certs
or combined NR+auth certs.  Some of course issue certs that
can be used for "everything".   It seems that the current filtering should
work in all of these cases and only return a single certificate with
NR on.

>If we go down this new path, it would imply that we need a new certUsage 
>for non-repudiation certificates.

I don't think we need to do that.  There seems to be just a local bug in
signText.  To support CAs that do not set the NR bit in any cert
is not particularly important.  If this is a requirement we end-up with
a rather hard algorithm where certficate contents have to compared as
well.  I would not follow such a path as there are too many bumps
and holes to cater for.  Although I personally don't think that there
are any legal differences between NR and not NR, the bit is at least
useful for key selection!

Anders

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Bob Relyea" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Mozilla Crypto" <dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org>
Sent: Monday, April 10, 2006 23:08
Subject: Re: certificate requirements for crypto.signText


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