Justin Dolske wrote:
> Out of curiousity... How many (if any) such CAs are currently included 
> in NSS?

It's not clear, since we've never gone back and looked at all the legacy 
CAs. There are certainly a number of root CAs that authorize third 
parties to run subordinate CAs and issue end entity certificates. This 
is fairly common with large companies -- they get a subordinate CA cert 
issued by a root, and then run their own CAs internally.

> It seems a little scary to be providing a way for these 3rd 
> party CAs to become operational in Mozilla products without going 
> through the Mozilla approval process. It seems like a different degree 
> or trust.

I don't think the practice of having third party subordinates is in and 
itself a problem. It's just that the root CA needs to have some sort of 
control over the subordinates (e.g., through appropriate legal 
agreements), and some way of ensuring (e.g., through audits) that the 
subordinates operate in accordance with the controls.

Remember that a lot of CAs working with enterprises outsource the 
Registration Authority function to those enterprises. In other words, 
the enterprise is ultimately responsible for doing verification of 
subscribers (e.g. when issuing certificates to employees and corporate 
web sites), even when the CA itself is issuing the certificate. Going 
from outsourced RAs to third-party subordinates adds some additional 
risk, but it's not a qualitatively different situation as I see it.


Frank

-- 
Frank Hecker
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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