Justin Erenkrantz wrote:
1) change the store_body interface to allow the storage provider direct access to f->next, so it can flush buckets up the output filter chain when they have been stored. As seen on trunk.2) keep the interface as-is, but read buckets in mod_cache and partition the brigade manually; only pass a "small" brigade with known-length buckets to the provider. (so no morphing and no arbitrary memory consumption) 3) change the interface: deal with the buckets entirely in mod_cache and just pass (char *,size_t) pairs to store_body 4) change the interface: pass some abstract "flush-me" callback in, which the provider can call to pass up then delete the bucket. (apr_brigade_flush doesn't quite fit the bill unfortunately) IMO: if you're going to be reading buckets from the brigade in mod_cache, you might as well go the whole hog and do (3), and stop exposing the provider to buckets or brigades at all. This will prevent the provider from doing any particular optimisations based on content type (like copying FILE buckets); feature or bug, take your pick.#3 gets my vote. I hate bucket brigades anyway. ;-)
Thinking about this a bit, the fact that buckets can be "too weird" at times, and every cache provider has to now care about this weirdness while caching, letting mod_cache deal with the weirdness and letting the cache providers deal with a trivial buffer is probably the way to go.
#3 it is.
The problem with #1 is that the failure case gets too goofy as it'd be hard to recover from failure (what I labeled as #5 in our list of principles). -- justin
The failure case I found was actually simple - you simply aren't allowed to. You just log the error, clean up the half-cached-entry, tell the filter to step out the way, and pass the brigade up the stack so the client can continue as if nothing had happened.
Of course this doesn't stop future module writers assuming they should return a cached error status, as this is the standard case everywhere else in the code.
Regards, Graham --
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