On 30.12.2010 13:43, Stefan Fritsch wrote:
>>> The latter. I suggest using ASN1_STRING_print_ex() with
>>> ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB (will escape them as
>>> \0).
>>
>> OK, makes sense.
>
> ASN1_STRING_print_ex escapes a whole lot of other stuff, too. So this
> change would also introduce an incompatibility with 2.2.x for all the
> SSL_{CLIENT,SERVER}_{I,S}_DN_* variables.
Good point, I didn't consider this when I came up with the suggestion
quoted above. My new proposal would be to (only) use
ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT
for the SSL_{CLIENT,SERVER}_{I,S}_DN_* variables instead. This will
escape the control characters (0x0 through 0x1f), but not the others
listed in RFC 2253 - most of which primarily make sense when a complete
DN is rendered, not single attribute values.
> This would then also be covered by the SSLOption LegacyDNStringFormat.
With the proposed change to the ASN1_STRING_print_ex flags, I think that
we could unconditionally use the new format for the
SSL_{CLIENT,SERVER}_{I,S}_DN_* variables, as there is no incompatibility
with "simple" strings (i.e., 7-bit characters encoded as
PRINTABLESTRINGs or IA5STRINGs). For non-ASCII characters, the current
code produces unusable results in many cases anyway, so I would not try
to retain that as a "legacy" string rendering.
> I would like to have opinions from other people before committing this.
Yes, please - additional opinions appreciated.
Kaspar
