On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 7:55 AM Tom Sommer <m...@tomsommer.dk> wrote:

>
> On 2019-09-13 14:50, William A Rowe Jr wrote:
>
> > The same would likely apply to ssl traffic abuse. At this late date,
> > clients connecting with 20 year old ssl semantics doesn't seem
> > noteworthy.
>
> SNI-support does not exist in some 3rd party services, like Sucuri etc.,
> so it's sadly a very real thing in 2019 as well.
>
> The "problem" is that a 403 is logged in this case, but no accompanied
> reason is logged in the ErrorLog, making it very hard to debug.
>

Services that don't speak modern TLS are certainly a real thing. Ignoring
them isn't unreasonable. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 were deprecated a year ago
and they do disappear mid-2020.

I'd agree this is confusing. Asking operators to set loglevel debug (heck,
in this case even loglevel info would suffice) is the very very very first
step to debug any problem behavior in httpd, increasing the signal
strength of errors outside of the operators control disturbs the other
99% of operators who've got this.

Would we agree that the correct error response to any TLS handshake
omission simply be a 400 error, and not an error that indicates some
authnz configuration trouble? Does that make it more obvious that the
error log needs to be inspected at info, or debug level?

A 426 response would seem to be appropriate for TLS 1.0/1.1 but it
doesn't have the granularity to ask that a legit TLS 1.2 connection
missing SNI needs to upgrade. Seems 400 might be best.

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