Le lundi 28 septembre 2015 à 12:02 +0200, Patrick Ohly a écrit : > On Mon, 2015-09-28 at 11:18 +0200, José Bollo wrote: > > Thank you Tomasz for your kind and quick answer. > > > > I'll introduce your remarks in a later version of the document. > > I'd like to add that the D-Bus patches are also needed to separate > applications from each other. Even if all system D-Bus services were > patched to handle messages from arbitrary, untrusted peers, expecting > the same from app developers probably wouldn't be wise. > > But you are right in the document, it is a tradeoff. >
Hello Patrick, I think that I understood what you wrote: native applications using D-Bus shouldn't be able to exchange messages by default. Am I right? So I think that in these case, D-Bus applies the policy based only on Smack labels and rules. Security rules based on Smack exist in smack compliant dbus implementation. Is it there the D-Bus patches you wrote about? But IIRC, this check is based only on D-Bus config files, not on smack's kernel database. If I'm not wrong, it is a big missing point in the document and have absolutely to be treated. Because in that case, what should be the correct lesson? Might I write that a such feature was only needed for Tizen 2 and that currently the kernel rules should apply in all cases? Because I am not sure to fully master the problem, I really wish some feedback and advise. Best regards José Bollo _______________________________________________ Dev mailing list Dev@lists.tizen.org https://lists.tizen.org/listinfo/dev
