Hi all, I also approved, +1 to merge. The PR is clean and we have a clear path forward regarding updates to Ranger.
Thanks, Alex On Tue, Oct 27, 2026 at 12:47 AM Dmitri Bourlatchkov <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi All, > > I approved [5246] in GH. > > From my POV the PR offers a reasonable path towards tighter authZ checks on > the /config endpoint. It does not break any APIs at this time. > > I propose merging it on Oct 28. > > [5246] https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/5246 > > Thanks, > Dmitri. > > On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 at 9:17 PM Dmitri Bourlatchkov <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > Hi Yufei, > > > > I'm not sure how we (Polaris community) can check the behaviour of (all) > > existing clients. > > > > PR [5246] provides ways to configure AuthZ grants in internal RBAC and OPA > > such that Polaris' behaviour would be the same as before the change. > > CHANGELOG entries inform users of this change. The onus is on users to > > validate their specific clients and use cases and configure the system > > appropriately. Corresponding Ranger Authorizer changes are to follow soon. > > > > Note that config defaults result in _old_ Polaris behaviour now. Changes > > to default behaviours will be introduced only after the next release. Users > > will have enough time to prepare. > > > > Heads up: PR [5246] approaches a mergegeable state from my POV. Only minor > > merge conflicts remain. > > > > Cheers, > > Dmitri. > > > > [5246] https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/5246 > > > > On Fri, Sep 4, 2026 at 6:22 PM Yufei Gu <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> > 1) Always on: soft-hide catalog properties (defaults) unless the > >> principal > >> has CATALOG_READ_PROPERTIES. Prefix / endpoints still returned so clients > >> can bootstrap. > >> > >> The hiding may break existing IRC clients as well, given that clients > >> won't > >> be able to get any "serve default" and "server overrides" now in case of > >> table-only permission. > >> > >> Can we double check this behavior change(hiding catalog properties) won't > >> break existing IRC clients or cause a meaningful client-side behavior > >> changes? > >> > >> Yufei > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Sep 4, 2026 at 11:03 AM vignesh a <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >> > Hi, > >> > > >> > Thanks all for the feedback > >> > > >> > On Yufei’s point: GET_CATALOG_CONFIG_PROPERTIES is an authorizable > >> > operation, not a new privilege. The RBAC mapping reuses the existing > >> > CATALOG_READ_PROPERTIES privilege (same idea as management getCatalog). > >> > The separate operation is mainly for non-native authorizers > >> (Ranger/OPA), > >> > where the SPI is operation-based. Dmitri already covered that on-thread. > >> > > >> > On JB’s concern about CATALOG_READ_CONFIG: I agree /v1/config is the > >> > Iceberg bootstrap call, and a hard 403 there is painful for principals > >> > that only have table- or namespace-scoped grants. Catalog-path AuthZ > >> does > >> > not see those scoped grants, so day-one enforcement would break those > >> > clients. That is why the PR keeps ENFORCE_CATALOG_CONFIG_AUTHORIZATION > >> > default false - the privilege is grantable now, but the endpoint itself > >> > is not hard-gated until an operator opts in. > >> > > >> > So today the PR is really two layers: > >> > > >> > 1) Always on: soft-hide catalog properties (defaults) unless the > >> > principal has CATALOG_READ_PROPERTIES. Prefix / endpoints still > >> > returned so clients can bootstrap. This is the actual disclosure fix. > >> > > >> > 2) Opt-in: hard-gate the whole endpoint behind CATALOG_READ_CONFIG when > >> > the flag is true (for folks who want every REST path covered by > >> AuthZ). > >> > > >> > JB’s suggestion to ship only (1) and drop (2) is a fair alternative if > >> > the list prefers zero bootstrap risk. I’m fine either way: > >> > > >> > A) Keep both, flag default false, open a follow-up to flip the default > >> > later (current PR shape), or > >> > B) Narrow #5246 [1] to properties soft-hide only; revisit endpoint > >> > hard-gate > >> > in a later DISCUSS if we still want it. > >> > > >> > In my pov: A matches “all REST endpoints should eventually have AuthZ” > >> > without breaking upgrades day one, but I’ll switch to B if that’s the > >> > preferred consensus. > >> > > >> > WDYT?? > >> > > >> > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/5246 [1] > >> > > >> > Thanks, > >> > Vignesh > >> > > >> > On Thu, 3 Sept 2026 at 20:06, Jean-Baptiste Onofré <[email protected]> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > Hi Vignesh > >> > > > >> > > It's actually a valid problem: CatalogConfigHandler.getConfig() > >> > > doesn't authz at all today. It means any authenticated principal who > >> > > guesses a warehouse name gets the catalog's properties. Clearly worth > >> > > to fix. > >> > > But, also, it returns PolarisEntity.getPropertiesAsMap() (should be > >> > > user-visible properties), without internalProperties. So the exposure > >> > > is admin-set config like default-base-location, not secrets. So, not > >> > > super "criticial". > >> > > > >> > > I think it makes sense to "hide" defaults behind > >> > > CATALOG_READ_PROPERTIES. It's similar to getCatalog path. This should > >> > > be the only thing in the PR imho. > >> > > > >> > > I don't think the new CATALOG_READ_CONFIG property makes sense. > >> > > /v1/config is the Iceberg bootstrap call, every client makes it before > >> > > doing anything. Your PR leans on TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES, but that only > >> > > works for catalog-level grants. A principal granted read one namespace > >> > > or one table gets a 403 and cannot bootstrap at all. So I don't think > >> > > it's a good idea, it's actually a unnecessary breaking change. > >> > > > >> > > Regards > >> > > JB > >> > > > >> > > On Fri, Aug 14, 2026 at 2:48 PM vignesh a <[email protected]> > >> > wrote: > >> > > > > >> > > > Hi all, > >> > > > > >> > > > Following the review discussion on #5246 [1] GET /v1/config > >> previously > >> > > had > >> > > > no AuthZ at all, so any authenticated principal that knew a > >> warehouse > >> > > name > >> > > > could read the full catalog properties (defaults). Not great for > >> > > > multi-tenant setups. > >> > > > > >> > > > Proposal: > >> > > > > >> > > > 1. Always-on (no new privilege needed for the sensitive bit): > >> > > Soft-hide > >> > > > defaults unless the principal has CATALOG_READ_PROPERTIES (same > >> idea > >> > > as > >> > > > management getCatalog). Prefix, endpoints, etc. are still > >> returned > >> > so > >> > > > clients can bootstrap. > >> > > > 2. New privilege CATALOG_READ_CONFIG (op GET_CATALOG_CONFIG), > >> > > grantable > >> > > > now. Hard 403 on the whole endpoint only if: > >> > > > polaris.features."ENFORCE_CATALOG_CONFIG_AUTHORIZATION" = true > >> > > Default is > >> > > > false, so operators can grant first (or rely on catalog-level > >> > content > >> > > > subsumption) and then turn enforcement on. > >> > > > 3. Later we flip the default to true and drop the flag. > >> > > > > >> > > > Why not hard-on in one shot: > >> > > > > >> > > > - Catalog-path checks don’t see table/ns-scoped grants → day-one > >> > > enforce > >> > > > can break least-privilege clients on upgrade. > >> > > > - Ranger still maps both ops to catalog-properties-read (no > >> > dedicated > >> > > > access type yet) → need time to update the service def + grants. > >> > > > > >> > > > Basically two-phase behaviour in one binary: permissions available > >> now, > >> > > > enforcement when people are ready. > >> > > > > >> > > > I can also split GET_CATALOG_CONFIG into a follow-up PR if that is > >> > > > preferred — the flag makes that easy either way. > >> > > > > >> > > > Mainly interested whether default-false + later flip is acceptable, > >> or > >> > if > >> > > > hard-on in a single release (with the breakage risk) is preferred. > >> [1] > >> > > > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/5246 > >> > > > > >> > > > Thanks, Vignesh > >> > > > >> > > >> > >
