I did notice that. Are you comnnected to a network and performing deserialization without input validation? Does the secure endpoint allow anon clients? That is even if you are using client certificates does the endpoint allow anon? Does your endpoint allow insecure cyphers?
Have a look at the changes in JGDMS. SafeServiceRegistrar authenticates and performs input validation first. Regards, Peter. Sent from my Samsung device. Include original message ---- Original message ---- From: Michał Kłeczek <mic...@kleczek.org> Sent: 14/02/2017 12:42:43 am To: dev@river.apache.org Subject: Re: OSGi NP Complete Was: OSGi - deserialization remote invocation strategy I fail to understand how you are more vulnerable because of trusted local class that securely downloads code on behalf of a service. And how in terms of security it is different from your SecureServiceRegistrar. Thanks, Michal Peter wrote: > Then you are vulnerable to deserialization gadget attacks, insecure cyphers >anon certs etc. > > JGDMS is as secure as possible with current cyphers, no anon certs, no known >insecure cyphers (tlsv1.2), input validation during deserialization, delayed >unmarshalling with authentication. > > I don't see why a compelling reason to give that up for a local class with a >readResolve method? > > Sorry. > > Regards, > > Peter. > Sent from my Samsung device. > > Include original message > ---- Original message ---- > From: Michał Kłeczek<mic...@kleczek.org> > Sent: 14/02/2017 12:14:41 am > To: dev@river.apache.org > Subject: Re: OSGi NP Complete Was: OSGi - deserialization remote invocation >strategy > > > Peter wrote: >> In jgdms I've enabled support for https unicast lookup in LookupLocator >>this establishes a connection to a Registrar only, not any service. This >>functionality doesn't exist in River. >> >> How do you propose establishing a connection using one of these endpoints? > I am not sure I understand the question. > In exactly the same way how today the connection is established by for > example a ProxyTrust instance > > Thanks, > Michal > >
