It can impliment AtomicSerial and perform input validation. How do you get from discovery to service without SafeServiceRegistrar lookup?
How does your wrapper authenticate the service before codebase and smart proxy download? Sent from my Samsung device. Include original message ---- Original message ---- From: Michał Kłeczek <mic...@kleczek.org> Sent: 14/02/2017 01:21:46 am To: dev@river.apache.org Subject: Re: OSGi NP Complete Was: OSGi - deserialization remote invocation strategy So if the CodeDownloadingSmartProxyWrapper implements AtomicSerial then it is fine? Cool - lets do that. Thanks, Michal Peter wrote: > Any Serializable class that implements AtomicSerial can perform input >validation. > > Using one of the secure discovery providers with authentication and input >validation. Download and deserialization permissions are granted dynamically >just after authentication, but before download. > > Regards, > > Peter. > > Sent from my Samsung device. > > Include original message > ---- Original message ---- > From: Michał Kłeczek<mic...@kleczek.org> > Sent: 14/02/2017 01:13:04 am > To: dev@river.apache.org > Subject: Re: OSGi NP Complete Was: OSGi - deserialization remote invocation >strategy > > So your SaveUnmarshallingProxy can do input validation fist as well, > can't it? > > BTW - how does the client unmarshalls SafeServiceRegistrar proxy in a > secure way? > > Thanks, > Michal > > Peter wrote: >> I did notice that. >> >> Are you comnnected to a network and performing deserialization without >>input validation? Does the secure endpoint allow anon clients? That is >>even if you are using client certificates does the endpoint allow anon? Does >>your endpoint allow insecure cyphers? >> >> Have a look at the changes in JGDMS. >> >> SafeServiceRegistrar authenticates and performs input validation first. >> >> Regards, >> >> Peter. >> >> Sent from my Samsung device. >> >> Include original message >> ---- Original message ---- >> From: Michał Kłeczek<mic...@kleczek.org> >> Sent: 14/02/2017 12:42:43 am >> To: dev@river.apache.org >> Subject: Re: OSGi NP Complete Was: OSGi - deserialization remote >>invocation strategy >> >> I fail to understand how you are more vulnerable because of trusted >> local class that securely downloads code on behalf of a service. >> >> And how in terms of security it is different from your >> SecureServiceRegistrar. >> >> Thanks, >> Michal >> >> Peter wrote: >>> Then you are vulnerable to deserialization gadget attacks, insecure >>>cyphers anon certs etc. >>> >>> JGDMS is as secure as possible with current cyphers, no anon certs, no >>>known insecure cyphers (tlsv1.2), input validation during deserialization, >>>delayed unmarshalling with authentication. >>> >>> I don't see why a compelling reason to give that up for a local class >>>with a readResolve method? >>> >>> Sorry. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Peter. >>> Sent from my Samsung device. >>> >>> Include original message >>> ---- Original message ---- >>> From: Michał Kłeczek<mic...@kleczek.org> >>> Sent: 14/02/2017 12:14:41 am >>> To: dev@river.apache.org >>> Subject: Re: OSGi NP Complete Was: OSGi - deserialization remote >>>invocation strategy >>> >>> >>> Peter wrote: >>>> In jgdms I've enabled support for https unicast lookup in >>>>LookupLocator this establishes a connection to a Registrar only, not any >>>>service. This functionality doesn't exist in River. >>>> >>>> How do you propose establishing a connection using one of these >>>>endpoints? >>> I am not sure I understand the question. >>> In exactly the same way how today the connection is established by for >>> example a ProxyTrust instance >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Michal >>> >>> >> > > >
